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PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION STANDARDS 
IN MASSACHUSETTS STATE AND FEDERAL 
COURTS 
ARTHUR D. WOLF* 
ABSTRACT 
Concurrent jurisdiction frequently allows attorneys the choice of 
filing a complaint in state or federal court.  State courts presumptively 
have jurisdiction over claims rooted in federal law.  At times, state 
courts are required to entertain federal claims.  Similarly, federal courts 
have authority over state claims because of diversity, federal question, 
and supplemental jurisdiction.  Many claims are rooted in both state and 
federal law, such as antitrust, civil rights, environmental, consumer 
protection, and civil liberties.  Confronted with the choice of state or 
federal court, the attorney must evaluate a variety of factors before 
deciding in which court to file. 
In a civil action where the plaintiff seeks a preliminary injunction, 
the selection of a state or federal court may determine the success of 
the motion for temporary relief.  The reason is simple: state and federal 
courts frequently apply differing standards to such preliminary 
motions.  Massachusetts state and federal courts apply different 
standards, although some courts have indicated to the contrary.  In the 
* Professor of Law and Director, Institute for Legislative & Governmental Affairs, 
Western New England University School of Law.  Prior to his teaching career, the author 
served as special counsel to Congressman Robert F. Drinan (4th C.D. MA) and as an attorney 
with the United States Department of Justice.  The author gratefully acknowledges the 
excellent research assistance that Head of Research Services Renee Rastorfer provided. 
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federal courts, the matter of differing standards is compounded by the 
complex Erie/Hanna doctrine.  State courts may be similarly bound 
by the much less well known “reverse-Erie” doctrine.  Consequently, the 
Massachusetts federal and state courts may be required to apply state 
standards to state claims and federal standards to federal claims. 
This Article explores the standards for preliminary injunctions in 
Massachusetts state and federal courts, and the intricacies that attend 
their application.  Part I provides background for the examination of 
state and federal standards.  Part II addresses the criteria for temporary 
relief in the Massachusetts state courts, while Part III reviews the 
comparable standards in the Massachusetts federal courts.  Part IV 
inquires into the Erie/Hanna doctrine as it applies to preliminary relief 
in the federal courts.  The Article concludes with the author's 
observations about the issues raised. 
INTRODUCTION 
Attorneys frequently have the choice of filing a complaint in state 
or federal court because of concurrent jurisdiction.  State courts 
presumptively have jurisdiction over claims rooted in federal law.1  At 
times, state courts are required to entertain federal claims.2  Similarly, 
federal courts have authority over state claims because of diversity, 
federal question, and supplemental jurisdiction.3  Many claims are 
rooted in both state and federal law, such as antitrust, civil rights, 
environmental, consumer protection, and civil liberties.  Confronted with 
the choice of state or federal court, the attorney must evaluate a variety 
of factors before deciding in which court to file. 
In a civil action where the plaintiff seeks a preliminary injunction, 
the selection of a state or federal court may determine the success of the 
motion for temporary relief.  The reason is simple: state and federal 
courts frequently apply differing standards to such preliminary motions.  
The Massachusetts state and federal courts apply different standards, 
although some courts have indicated to the contrary.4  In the federal 
courts, the matter of differing standards is compounded by the complex 
Erie/Hanna doctrine.5  The state courts may be similarly bound by the 
1. See Taflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455 (1990). 
2. See Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356 (1990); Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947). 
3. See discussion infra Part I. 
4. See Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc. v. PepsiCo, Inc., 160 F.3d 58 (1st Cir. 1998); see 
also discussion infra Part II. 
5. See infra Part IV. 
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much less well known “reverse-Erie” doctrine.6  Consequently, the 
Massachusetts federal and state courts may be required to apply state 
standards to state claims and federal standards to federal claims. 
This article explores the standards for preliminary injunctions in 
Massachusetts state and federal courts, and the intricacies that attend 
their application.  Part I provides background for the examination of 
state and federal standards.  Part II addresses the criteria for temporary 
relief in the Massachusetts state courts, while Part III reviews the 
comparable standards in the Massachusetts federal courts.  Part IV 
inquires into the Erie/Hanna doctrine as it applies to preliminary relief 
in the federal courts.  The Article concludes with the author's 
observations about the issues raised. 
I. BACKGROUND 
In 1980, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) decided 
Packaging Industries Group, Inc. v. Cheney, which announced new and 
definitive standards for the issuance of preliminary injunctions.7  In its 
winter 2007 issue, the Massachusetts Law Review published Attorney 
Cameron F. Kerry’s assessment of twenty-five years of state court 
decisions under the regime of Packaging Industries.8  He concluded that 
the SJC’s decision and the cases that followed “establish[ed] the 
preliminary injunction as one of the most important and useful remedies 
in the kit of tools available to modern courts.”9 
In sharp contrast, the United States Supreme Court did not establish 
clear, firm standards for preliminary injunctions until November, 2008.  
In Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council,10 the Court finally 
announced definitive criteria for the granting or denial of preliminary 
injunctions.11  Adopting a four-part test, familiar to readers of First 
Circuit decisions, the Court purported to rest upon prior precedents for 
this four-criteria approach.12  In fact, it had never expressly and clearly 
6. See, e.g., Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R., 342 U.S. 359 (1952).  The 
“reverse-Erie” doctrine, where a state court may be required to follow federal procedural rules 
in enforcing federal rights, is not discussed in this Article.  See generally Kevin M. Clermont, 
Reverse-Erie, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (2006). 
7. Packaging Indus. Grp., Inc. v. Cheney, 405 N.E.2d 106, 111-12 (Mass. 1980). 
8. Cameron F. Kerry, Unpacking the Massachusetts Preliminary Injunction Standard, 
90 MASS. L. REV. 160 (2007). 
9. Id. at 178. 
10. 555 U.S. 7 (2008). 
11. Over the years, the courts have used the words “preliminary,” “temporary,” 
“interlocutory,” and “provisional” to describe interim injunctive relief.  This Article will use 
these words interchangeably. 
12. Winter, 555 U.S. at 20; e.g., Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311-12 
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so ruled in unmistakable language.  At least the lower federal courts did 
not think so.13 
Finally, the question has arisen whether a federal court must apply 
state standards for preliminary relief when the moving party’s claims are 
based on state law.  Although the Supreme Court has not addressed this 
issue in the context of preliminary injunctions, it has given some 
guidance in a series of cases beginning with its landmark ruling in Erie 
R.R. Co. v. Tompkins.14  Because Massachusetts state and federal 
standards for interlocutory injunctions differ, the application of the Erie 
doctrine to motions for preliminary relief for state claims in federal court 
is critical. 
This Article will focus on the decisions in the Massachusetts state 
and federal courts addressing the issue of interlocutory injunctive relief, 
including the conflict between state and federal law when litigating in 
federal court.  After consideration of certain preliminary matters, the 
Article will address the standards the state courts have adopted for 
preliminary relief.  The next section will address the federal decisions, 
focusing on the United States Supreme Court and the First Circuit Court 
of Appeals.  The analysis will then proceed to examine the conflicts that 
arise between federal and state standards under the Erie doctrine,15 
peculiarly a product of litigation in the federal courts involving state law 
claims.  The question is whether state or federal standards should apply 
to motions for preliminary injunctions when the underlying claim is 
state-based.  A conclusion follows this last section. 
Since the early days of the Commonwealth and of the Republic, the 
preliminary injunction has enjoyed a long and sometimes distinguished 
career in American law, state and federal.  It is one of the most important 
tools at the disposal of attorneys.  The preliminary injunction is used in a 
wide variety of circumstances: to prevent an imminent merger and 
acquisition; to enforce covenants not to compete; to restrain the violation 
of civil rights and civil liberties; to prevent domestic abuse; to resolve 
property and zoning disputes; to address rights of school children in a 
variety of settings; and to advance a myriad of other claims. 
When seeking a preliminary injunction, the litigant must comply 
with a variety of procedural and substantive requirements.  This Article 
(1982). 
13. See generally Arthur D. Wolf, Preliminary Injunctions: The Varying Standards, 7 
W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 173 (1984). 
14. 304 U.S. 70 (1938). 
15. The Erie doctrine is a product of the landmark decision in Erie R.R. Co. v. 
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 70 (1938). 
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will address only the substantive standards that determine whether the 
court will issue a preliminary injunction.  To the extent state and federal 
law in Massachusetts differ, the Article will note such differences.  The 
SJC has stated: “[w]here the [Massachusetts] Legislature in enacting a 
statute follows a Federal statute, we follow the adjudged construction of 
the Federal statute by the Federal courts.”16  The court has applied this 
interpretative rule to the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure, which 
track for the most part the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.17 
Assuming the litigant has complied with the procedural 
prerequisites for obtaining a preliminary injunction, the litigant must 
then persuade the court that it is entitled to the remedy sought.  The 
moving party has a heavy burden to demonstrate, factually and legally, it 
is entitled to the “extraordinary”18 remedy of injunction, although a 
commentator on state court decisions has referred to it as “an ordinary 
remedy”19 in this Commonwealth.  The Massachusetts state courts have 
developed two lines of cases in determining whether a preliminary 
injunction should issue.  Similarly, the federal courts have developed 
multiple standards for the issuance of such relief.  Both the federal and 
the state standards for preliminary injunctive relief will be addressed 
here. 
Before examining the applicable precedents, it is important to recall 
the purpose for seeking a temporary injunction.  Historically, the courts, 
following the lead of their British counterparts, have identified the 
preservation of the status quo as the object of interim relief.20  One court 
has stated that the status quo “is universally defined as the last 
uncontested status which preceded the pending controversy.”21  That 
premise has two difficulties.  First, the courts have struggled with 
determining what constitutes the status quo, even given the “universal” 
definition. 
Second, in many instances, the party moving for preliminary relief 
16. Packaging Indus. Grp., Inc. v. Cheney, 405 N.E.2d 106, 108 (Mass. 1980) (and 
cases therein cited); accord, Scaccia v. State Ethics Commission, 727 N.E.2d 824, 828 (Mass. 
2000); Mayo v. Key Fin. Servs., 678 N.E.2d 1311, 1313 (Mass. 1997). 
17. Farley v. Sprague, 372 N.E.2d 1298, 1301 (Mass. 1978) (“absent compelling 
reasons to the contrary”), 
18. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 9 (2008); Weinberger v. Romero-
Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 440 (1944). 
19. Kerry, supra note 8, at 178 (arguing that under state court precedents the 
preliminary injunction today is an “ordinary remedy”). 
20. See, e.g., Parker v. Winnipiseogee Lake Cotton and Woolen Co., 67 U.S. (2 Black) 
545 (1862); Irwin v. Dixion, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 10 (1850). 
21. Miss. Power & Light Co. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 609 F. Supp. 333, 343 (S.D. 
Miss. 1984), aff’d, 760 F.2d 618 (5th Cir. 1985). 
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does not want the status quo preserved.  On the contrary, the movant 
wants the court to order the opposing party to take mandatory or 
affirmative action to alter the status quo, not simply to refrain from 
engaging in a purported illegality.  For example, if the plaintiffs, who 
wish to protest peacefully without interference from hostile onlookers, 
are seeking a preliminary injunction to secure police protection, they do 
not want to preserve the status quo: assaults by hecklers while the police 
do nothing.22  They want the court to order the police to prevent violence 
against them by opponents. 
In recent years, the courts have recognized the inherent problems in 
predicating interlocutory relief on maintaining the status quo.  
Consequently, they have shifted the focus to preserving the subject 
matter of the lawsuit so that the court will be able to grant effective relief 
when the suit is resolved on the merits.  “On the basis of [an 
abbreviated] record, the moving party must show that, without the 
requested relief, it may suffer a loss of rights that cannot be vindicated 
should it prevail after a full hearing on the merits.”23  This approach too 
creates difficulties. 
While preservation of the subject matter is the proper concern of 
interim relief, the American legal system operates on the assumption that 
individuals (natural and corporate) are free to act as they please until 
they have been adjudged liable for injury to another.  Interim relief is 
inconsistent with this basic premise because it restricts freedom of action 
without a final judgment of liability.24  Further, “a preliminary 
injunction must be granted or denied after an abbreviated presentation of 
the facts and the law.”25  In light of that reality, reconciling the need for 
interim relief with the restriction on freedom that it imposes is the proper 
focus of the search for appropriate criteria governing interlocutory 
injunctions.  Through the years, the state and federal courts have 
explored a wide variety of responses to this tension. 
22. See, e.g., Belknap v. Leary, 427 F.2d 496 (2d Cir. 1970).   
23. Packaging Indus. Grp., Inc. v. Cheney, 405 N.E.2d 106, 111 (1980). 
24. See Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308 
(1999) (the Court refused to allow the injunctive remedy to prevent transfer of assets prior to a 
judgment on the merits).  See generally Stephen B. Burbank, The Bitter with the Sweet: 
Tradition, History, and Limitations on Federal Judicial Power—A Case Study, 75 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1291, 1320 n.161 (2000) (exploring fully the issues raised in Grupo). 
25. Packaging Indus., 405 N.E.2d at 111. 
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II. THE STATE COURTS 
A. Overview 
The Massachusetts state courts have developed two major lines of 
cases in addressing motions for preliminary relief: the Packaging 
Industries standards (hereinafter “traditional standards”) and the 
“abbreviated” standards.  The traditional standards require that the trial 
court evaluate the parties’ likelihood of success on the merits in 
combination with their irreparable harm, and then balance the irreparable 
harm and the likelihood of success of both parties, granting the motion if 
the balance tips in the direction of the moving party.26  In this state, the 
courts have also, on occasion, required the moving party to demonstrate 
that the issuance of the preliminary injunction will not adversely affect 
the “public interest” or will positively advance it.27   
The second line of cases requires the moving party to meet 
“abbreviated standards” to secure a preliminary injunction.  In civil 
actions brought by the State Attorney General (or other governmental 
unit) or by “private” attorneys general, the state courts require only that 
the moving party demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits and 
that the requested relief would be in the public interest.28 
B. Traditional Standards 
The leading case for preliminary injunction standards in the state 
courts is Packaging Industries Group, Inc. v. Cheney.29  In Packaging 
Industries, the plaintiffs brought suit to secure injunctive and monetary 
relief from the defendant Cheney, a former vice-president of the plaintiff 
companies.30  The claims focused on certain business torts, including 
unlawful use of trade secrets and breach of fiduciary duties.31  The SJC, 
in affirming the denial of an interlocutory injunction, identified a three-
step analysis that a trial judge must undertake to determine whether a 
preliminary injunction should be granted to the moving party.32 
First, the trial judge must evaluate “in combination the moving 
26. See id. at 114. 
27. See John T. Callahan & Sons, Inc. v. City of Malden, 713 N.E.2d 955, 960 (Mass. 
1999) (internal citation omitted). 
28. See Town of Brookline v. Goldstein, 447 N.E.2d 641, 644 (Mass. 1983). 
29. Packaging Indus., 405 N.E.2d 106.  See generally Kerry, supra note 8 (exploring 25 
years of state court decisions under Packaging Industries). 
30. Packaging Indus., 405 N.E.2d at 108. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. at 111-12. 
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party’s claim of injury [while the case is pending] and chance of success 
on the merits.”33  Second, if failure to issue the temporary order would 
subject the movant “to a substantial risk of irreparable harm,”34 the court 
must then evaluate the injury to the non-moving party if the injunction is 
granted together with its chance of succeeding on the merits.  Third, the 
court must now balance the risk of irreparable harm to the plaintiff 
against the injury to the defendant if the injunction is granted or denied 
with their respective chances of succeeding on the merits.  The trial 
court should issue the preliminary injunction if the balance “cuts in favor 
of the moving party.”35 
The trial court’s evaluation of the impact of a grant or denial of 
temporary relief pending a decision on the merits is the critical factor.  
“It is the combination of likelihood of success and degree of irreparable 
injury that matters.”36  Further, in “an appropriate case,” the SJC has 
directed trial judges to consider an additional factor: the benefits or the 
“risk of harm to the public interest” if the preliminary injunction is 
granted or denied.37  In such cases, the trial court must determine 
whether the public interest is promoted or adversely affected by the 
grant or denial.  Such harm to the public interest should be considered 
when “the dispute does not involve [only] private parties.”38The SJC has 
defined “irreparable harm,” in the context of a motion for preliminary 
relief, as the injury that may occur between the request for temporary 
relief and a judgment on the merits.39  “In the context of a preliminary 
33. Id. at 112. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. at 114.  Accord T & D Video, Inc. v. Revere, 670 N.E.2d 162, 165 (Mass. 1996); 
Commonwealth v. Mass. CRINC, 466 N.E.2d 792, 797 (Mass. 1984).  The SJC’s approach in 
Packaging Industries is similar to the sliding scale approach that some federal courts of 
appeals took prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Winter.  See text infra Part III.B.3. 
37. Town of Brookline v. Goldstein, 447 N.E.2d 641, 644 (Mass. 1983).  Although the 
SJC applied the three-factor Packaging Industries test, the following year it held that a 
government party’s motion for a preliminary injunction need only satisfy a two-pronged test.  
Cf. Bettigole v. Assessors of Springfield, 178 N.E.2d 10 (Mass. 1961) (indicating that “public 
interest” should be addressed when a governmental unit is the defendant in a suit for 
injunctive relief). 
38. See John T. Callahan & Sons, Inc. v. City of Malden, 713 N.E.2d 955, 960 (Mass. 
1999).  The “public interest” factor in determining preliminary relief should not be confused 
with the “public interest” as an element of a substantive claim or defense.  See Bank of New 
England, N.A. v. Mortg. Corp. of New England, 567 N.E.2d 961, 966 (Mass. 1991); cf. 
Planned Parenthood League of Massachusetts v. Operation Rescue, 550 N.E.2d 1361 (Mass. 
1990).  See generally Kerry, supra note 8, at 169-73.  The “public interest” as an element of a 
claim or defense may enter the determination of a motion for a temporary injunction when the 
court evaluates the parties’ chance of success under the Packaging Industries standards. 
39. See Packaging Indus., 405 N.E.2d at 112 n.11. 
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injunction the only rights which may be irreparably lost are those not 
capable of vindication by a final judgment, rendered either at law or in 
equity.”40  In short, if no harm is likely to occur before a trial and 
judgment on the merits, the moving party is not entitled to relief because 
it has failed to show “irreparable” harm. 
On occasion, the irreparable injury asserted involves 
constitutionally protected rights, such as free speech.  For example, in 
Planned Parenthood League of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Operation Rescue, 
the plaintiffs sued to enjoin the defendants from forcefully interfering, 
largely through physical obstruction, with access to clinics performing 
abortions.41  Because pregnancies are time sensitive, the plaintiffs 
prevailed on the question of irreparable harm against the defendants’ 
defense based on the First Amendment (here, freedom of speech and 
assembly).42 
In rejecting the defendants’ assertion, the SJC ruled that the risk of 
irreparable injury must be assessed at the time of the hearing on the 
preliminary injunction.43  At that point, the trial court has not yet 
formulated an injunctive decree, so the alleged irreparable harm is 
somewhat speculative.  “[T]he defendants are not entitled to assume that 
the judge will issue an injunction which deprives them of their right to 
free expression.”44  Indeed the trial court’s obligation is to craft an 
injunctive order that carefully separates lawful from unlawful activities, 
enjoining only the second.  Once the preliminary injunction is entered, 
the defendants may raise again their First Amendment rights, 
challenging the constitutionality of the order.  Indeed in Planned 
Parenthood, the SJC addressed the impact of the decree from a First 
Amendment point of view.45 
In sharp contrast, when a party has shown that its First Amendment 
rights are already in jeopardy because of past actions by the government, 
irreparable injury is presumed.  For example, in T & D Video, Inc. v. 
Revere, an adult video store sued the City of Revere to enjoin it from 
enforcing zoning ordinances that, in effect, would prevent the video 
40. Id.; see also OWEN M. FISS & DOUG RENDLEMEN, INJUNCTIONS 59 (2nd ed. 1984).  
In the context of a request for a permanent injunction, “irreparable harm” means that the 
moving party does not have an adequate remedy at law, ordinarily damages. 
41. Planned Parenthood League of Mass., Inc. v. Operation Rescue, 550 N.E.2d 1361 
(Mass. 1990). 
42. Id. at 1371. 
43. Id. at 1369. 
44. Id.  
45. Id. at 1369-71. 
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store from opening for business.46  In affirming the issuance of a 
preliminary injunction against Revere, the SJC first found that the 
plaintiff had demonstrated a “likelihood of success on the merits”47 of its 
First Amendment claim.  Having so ruled, the court held that irreparable 
injury to the plaintiff followed as a matter of law, citing federal court 
precedents.48 
Finally, as noted above, in “appropriate” cases, the SJC has directed 
trial judges to consider an additional factor: the “risk of harm to the 
public interest” if the preliminary injunction is granted or denied.49   
Such harm to the public interest should be considered when “the dispute 
does not involve [only] private parties.”50  Thus the courts will examine 
the “public interest” criterion where a governmental unit, state or local, 
is the defendant in a civil action.51  In such cases, the trial court must 
first evaluate the traditional standards articulated in the Packaging 
Industries case.  Then the court must examine the “public interest” to 
determine whether the grant or denial of the preliminary injunction will 
promote or adversely affect such an interest. 
In short, the moving party must demonstrate that it has satisfied the 
traditional standards the SJC identified in the Packaging Industries 
case.52  If the defendant is a public body, the movant must show 
additionally that the issuance of the temporary injunction will promote 
46. 670 N.E.2d 162, 164 (Mass. 1996). 
47. Id. at 166.  See A.M.F., Ltd. v. City of Medford, 704 N.E.2d 184 (Mass. 1999) 
(recognizing that in a First Amendment case, the defendant city has the burden to show the 
constitutionality of the ordinance restricting speech in determining whether the moving party 
has shown a likelihood of success on the merits). 
48. T & D Video, 670 N.E.2d at 166.  E.g., Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) 
(plurality opinion) (“The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of 
time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.”); see also Cirelli v. Town of Johnston 
School District, 885 F. Supp. 663 (D.R.I. 1995).  In Cirelli, the plaintiff teacher sued to enjoin 
her school’s directive that she not videotape unsafe and unhealthy conditions to which her 
students were exposed.  Id. at 664.  After the plaintiff demonstrated she was likely to succeed 
on the merits of her First Amendment claim, the federal district court concluded that 
irreparable injury would be presumed.  Id. at 668.  Although the Cirelli holding involved a 
request for a temporary restraining order, the issue of irreparable injury overlaps with 
preliminary relief. 
49. Brookline v. Goldstein, 447 N.E.2d 641, 644 (Mass. 1983); see Landry v. Attorney 
Gen., 709 N.E.2d 1085, 1090 (Mass. 1999). 
50. See John T. Callahan & Sons, Inc. v. City of Malden, 713 N.E.2d 955, 960 (Mass. 
1999). 
51. Id.; see Siemens Bldg. Techs., Inc. v. Div. of Capital Asset Mgmt., 791 N.E.2d 340, 
345 (Mass. 2003); Tri-Nel Mgt., Inc. v. Bd. of Health of Barnstable, 741 N.E.2d 37, 40 (Mass. 
2001); Landry, 709 N.E.2d at 1090. 
52. Packaging Indus. Grp. v. Cheney, 405 N.E.2d 106, 112 (Mass. 1980). 
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the public interest, or alternatively, that it will not adversely affect it.53  
Since the moving party must demonstrate that all factors favor issuance 
of the injunction, the state courts usually begin with an examination of 
whether the moving party is likely to succeed on the merits.54   If that 
party fails to show the likelihood of prevailing on the merits, the 
appellate court, at least, will end their inquiry.55   Trial courts, however, 
ordinarily address all criteria in the event the appellate court disagrees in 
its assessment of the standards, thus allowing the appellate court to 
direct the issuance or denial of the temporary injunction.56 
C. Abbreviated Standards 
The state courts have also developed a second line of cases, 
applying abbreviated standards for the grant of a preliminary injunction.  
These cases are limited to civil actions commenced by a governmental 
entity57 or a citizen “acting as a private attorney general to enforce a 
statute or a declared policy of the Legislature.”58  In abbreviating the 
traditional standards, the courts only require that the moving party 
demonstrate: (1) “a likelihood of success on the merits”;59 and (2) that 
the “requested relief would be in the public interest.”60 
The state courts have applied these abbreviated standards in two 
types of cases: where the plaintiff is “the government or a citizen acting 
as a private attorney general.”61  In these cases, the plaintiff, in moving 
for a preliminary injunction, does not have to show irreparable injury or 
that a balancing of the harms favors the moving party, although the SJC 
in LeClair suggested that any harm to the plaintiff would be subsumed 
in the evaluation of the public interest factor.62 
This line of cases apparently began with Commonwealth v. Mass. 
53. See Cote-Whitacre v. Dep’t of Public Health, 844 N.E.2d 623, 634-35 (Mass. 
2006); Loyal Order of Moose v. Bd. of Health of Yarmouth, 790 N.E.2d 203, 206-07 (Mass. 
2003); Healey v. Comm’r of Pub. Welfare, 605 N.E.2d 279, 285 (Mass. 1992). 
54. Fordyce v. Town of Hanover, 929 N.E.2d 929 (Mass. 2010). 
55. Id.; Wilson v. Comm’r of Transitional Assistance, 809 N.E.2d 524 (Mass. 2004); 
Siemens, 791 N.E.2d 340; Packaging Indus., 405 N.E.2d at 111-12. 
56. Wilson, 809 N.E.2d at 528-29. 
57. E.g., Commonwealth v. Fremont Inv. & Loan, 897 N.E.2d 548, 550 (Mass. 2008) 
(state government); Brookline v. Goldstein, 447 N.E.2d 641, 644 (Mass. 1983) (local 
government). 
58. LeClair v. Town of Norwell, 719 N.E.2d 464, 468 (Mass. 1999); accord Edwards v. 
Boston, 562 N.E.2d 834, 837 (Mass. 1990). 
59. LeClair, 719 N.E.2d at 468. 
60. Id. 
61. Id.; accord Fremont Inv. & Loan, 897 N.E.2d at 550. 
62. LeClair, 719 N.E.2d at 472-73. 
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CRINC.63  In this case, the Attorney General brought suit to enforce the 
anti-trust and “bottle bill” laws against defendant beer distributors and a 
beer container recycling company.64  After a hearing, the trial court 
entered a preliminary injunction restraining the defendants from 
violating the antitrust law and the bottle bill.65  The order contained both 
prohibitory and affirmative provisions.66  On appeal, the defendants 
contended that the trial court failed to apply the tripartite test of 
Packaging Industries.67 
After reciting the three-step test articulated in Packaging Industries, 
the SJC agreed that the trial judge failed to apply the irreparable injury 
and balancing tests of Packaging Industries.68  The court further held, 
however, that the Packaging Industries standards apply to suits between 
private parties.69  They are inapplicable to suits by the Attorney General 
because he is acting pursuant to “his broad common law and statutory 
powers to represent the public interest.”70  These powers may rest on 
general statutory authority, e.g., G. L. c. 12, § 10, specific statutory 
authority, e.g., G. L. c. 93, §§ 8, 9, 12, and 13, or on “a common law 
duty.”71 
The SJC has extended the CRINC holding to civil actions by private 
persons who are suing in the capacity of a “private” attorney general.  
For example, in LeClair,72 the plaintiffs, ten taxpayers, sued the town 
alleging it violated state and local law in choosing vendors to conduct a 
feasibility study for the construction of a new public school, and to 
design the school if the study gave the green light.73 
In LeClair, the SJC first noted that the traditional standards for 
awarding preliminary injunctive relief would not apply since the 
63. Commonwealth v. Mass. CRINC, 466 N.E.2d 792 (Mass. 1984).  Shortly before its 
decision in Mass. CRINC, the SJC applied the three-step test of Packaging Industries in a civil 
action initiated by the Attorney General, Commonwealth v. County of Suffolk, 418 N.E. 2d 
1234 (Mass. 1981), and by a local government.  Brookline v. Goldstein, 447 N.E.2d 641, 644 
(Mass. 1983).  In dictum, the court noted that in “appropriate” cases the public interest would 
be considered. 
64. Mass. CRINC, 466 N.E.2d at 796. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. at 797. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. at 798.  In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on United States v. 
D’Annolfo, 474 F. Supp. 220, 222 (D. Mass. 1979). 
71. Id. 
72. LeClair v. Town of Norwell, 719 N.E.2d 464 (Mass. 1999). 
73. Id. at 466. 
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plaintiffs brought the suit in their capacity as “private attorneys 
general.”74  The plaintiffs acquired this status because they were suing 
under c. 40, § 53 of the General Laws, the statute authorizing ten 
taxpayers to enjoin local officials who unlawfully “are about to raise or 
expend money or incur obligations.”75 
In such circumstances, the private attorneys general (i.e., the 
taxpayers), in moving for a temporary injunction, need only show a 
likelihood of prevailing on the merits and that the public interest 
supports the injunction.  In these suits, the SJC has applied the 
abbreviated standards in favor of private attorneys general even though 
the defendant is a governmental unit, which ordinarily would require the 
moving party to satisfy the traditional standards of Packaging Industries 
plus the public interest factor noted earlier. 
To date, the state courts have attached the “private attorney 
general” label to only a limited number of lawsuits, which allow the 
party moving for a preliminary injunction to utilize the CRINC two-
pronged test.  The classic cases have involved sections of the General 
Laws authorizing suits by a certain number of taxpayers.76   Presumably 
the courts would apply the same two-pronged test for preliminary relief 
to taxpayer suits under still other provisions of the General Laws, such 
as G.L. c. 35, § 35 (“one or more taxable inhabitants” of a county may 
sue to enforce laws regulating county accounts and finances); G.L. c. 44, 
§ 59 (“one or more taxable inhabitants” may sue to enforce laws 
regulating municipal finances and debt); and G.L. c. 164, § 69 (20 
taxable inhabitants of a city or town may sue to enforce laws regulating 
municipal generation of electric or gas). 
Recently, the Massachusetts Appeals Court in dictum described 
another category of civil actions where the private attorney general 
doctrine could apply.  In Carroll v. Marzilli,77 the court rejected the 
plaintiffs’ argument that their motion for a preliminary injunction should 
be measured by the abbreviated standards applicable to private attorneys 
general.78  The court held that the statute under which the plaintiffs sued 
did not authorize them to represent anyone other than themselves.79  
Their statutory claims were strictly private, not implicating the public 
74. Id. at 468. 
75. MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 40, § 53; see also Edwards v. Boston, 562 N.E.2d 834 
(Mass. 1990) (local taxpayers’ suit under MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40, § 53). 
76. See Natick Auto Sales Inc. v. Dep’t of Procurement & Gen. Servs., 715 N.E.2d 84, 
85 (Mass. App. Ct. 1999) (twenty-four state taxpayer suit under G.L. c. 29, § 63). 
77. Carroll v. Marzilli, 915 N.E.2d 268 (Mass. App. Ct. 2009). 
78. Id. at 271. 
79. Id. at 272. 
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interest. 
The appeals court suggested, however, that if a statute authorizes 
the plaintiff to represent other injured persons, as well as itself; the 
plaintiff could be cast into the role of a private attorney general.80  In 
such instances, the abbreviated standards for preliminary relief would be 
available.  The court offered two examples of such statutory 
authorization: G.L. c 149, § 105A (employee may represent himself and 
“other employees similarly situated”), and G.L. c. 151, § 1B (injured 
party may represent himself and “others similarly situated”).81  The court 
did not indicate whether the “private attorney general” doctrine would 
extend to any class action under Rule 23 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Beyond these taxpayer and class action-type suits, the state courts 
will probably tread very lightly in applying the CRINC two-pronged test 
to private attorney general civil actions.  The appeals court, though, has 
suggested that a single private plaintiff could, in effect, serve as the 
surrogate for a public agency in an appropriate case.82  In this instance, 
however, the appeals court did not apply to that suggestion the 
abbreviated standards for securing a preliminary injunction.  It did, 
however, apply the suggestion to the issue whether a judge, in granting a 
preliminary injunction, could award to the moving party “the ultimate 
relief” the party seeks after judgment on the merits,83 much as it would if 
a government agency were the moving party. 
Furthermore, the appeals court has indicated that “[t]he public 
interest” might be a factor in strictly private litigation when a party seeks 
preliminary relief.84  It stated that the “public interest may also be 
considered in a case between private parties where the applicable 
substantive law involves issues that concern public interest.”85  The 
“public interest” factor in determining preliminary relief should not be 
confused, however, with the “public interest” as an element of a 
substantive claim or defense.  Nonetheless, the “public interest” as an 
element of a claim or defense may enter the determination of a motion 
for a temporary injunction when the court evaluates the parties’ chances 
80. Id. at 271-72. 
81. Id. 
82. See Petricca Constr. Co. v. Commonwealth, 640 N.E. 2d 780 (Mass. App. Ct. 
1994). 
83. Id. at 785. 
84. See Bank of New England, N.A. v. Mortgage Corp. of New England, 567 N.E.2d 
961, 966 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991); cf. Planned Parenthood League of Mass., Inc., v. Operation 
Rescue, 550 N.E.2d 1361 (Mass. 1990).  See generally Kerry, supra note 8, at 169-173. 
85. See Bank of New England, 567 N.E.2d at 966.  See generally Kerry, supra note 8, at 
169-70. 
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of success under the Packaging Industries standards. 
Under Massachusetts’s decisional law, tension exists between the 
four-step approach (which includes the public interest) for preliminary 
relief when a governmental unit is the defendant and the decisions 
allowing a private attorney general to demonstrate only two factors for a 
temporary injunction in suits against governmental units.  When a 
private party commences a civil action (perhaps even as a class action 
under Rule 23) against a governmental unit, it must satisfy the standards 
of Packaging Industries/CRINC to obtain a temporary injunction.   In 
sharp contrast, if that private party sues a governmental entity as a 
“private attorney general,” its burden is reduced considerably to the two-
factor test of LeClair.  To date, the SJC does not appear to have 
addressed specifically this tension between the two lines of cases. 
III.  THE FEDERAL COURTS 
A. Overview 
The first case of any substance in the United States Supreme Court 
involved a preliminary injunction.  In Georgia v. Brailsford,86 Georgia 
invoked the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to enjoin 
temporarily the execution of a money judgment previously entered by 
the United States Circuit Court87 for the District of Georgia.  In that 
prior suit, Brailsford and others, who were British subjects, recovered 
the judgment based on a debt owed them by a citizen of Georgia.88 
In 1782, Georgia enacted a law that confiscated all debts owed to 
British subjects, making the state the beneficiary of such obligations.89  
The debt to British subjects was largely a product of the Revolutionary 
War.  During the pendency of the earlier private suit in the Federal 
Circuit Court between the American debtors and the British creditors, 
Georgia sought to intervene to assert its rights under the confiscation 
law.90  When the federal judge denied the intervention motion,91 Georgia 
86. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 402 (1792) (the caption in the official report misspelled the 
defendant’s name as “Braislford”).  The Court decided Brailsford six months before the 
celebrated case of Chisholm v. Georgia. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793) (involving state sovereign 
immunity). 
87. From 1789 until 1911, two federal courts had trial responsibilities: the district court 
and the circuit court, which, except for one year between 180l and 1802, did not have its own 
judges.  RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND 
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 21-22, 28-30 (6th ed. 2009). 
88. Brailsford, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 404. 
89. Id. at 402-03. 
90. Id. at 404. 
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instituted an original suit against Brailsford and other British creditors in 
the Supreme Court of the United States.92 
To protect its asserted right to the money judgment pending a 
decision on the merits in the Supreme Court, Georgia moved for a 
temporary injunction to stay the proceedings in the circuit court and to 
restrain the marshal from paying over to the Brailsford plaintiffs any of 
the proceeds on the judgment.93  In a 4-2 decision,94 including Justice 
Iredell,95 the Court granted the injunction pending disposition of the case 
on the merits.96  Because each of the Justices stated his views in seriatim 
opinions (a practice that did not last long in the Court), it is difficult to 
articulate a holding in the case.  Justices Cushing and Johnson97 
dissented on the grounds that Georgia had an adequate remedy at law,98 
a defense to equity suits mandated by Section 16 of the Judiciary Act of 
1789.99 
At the next term of the Court in 1793, the defendants moved to 
dissolve the injunction on alternative grounds: (1) the State of Georgia 
had no remedy at all; and (2) even if it did, Section l6 barred the 
injunction because of the adequacy of the legal remedy.100  With Justice 
Johnson not sitting, the Court denied the motion to dissolve.101  In a 
three-sentence opinion, Chief Justice Jay held that, even though the 
91. Id. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. at 405. 
94. In 1792, the Court had five associate Justices and the Chief Justice. 
95. Although Justice Iredell sat in the Circuit Court in the suit between Brailsford and 
Spaulding, he nonetheless rendered an opinion which he stated was “detached from every 
previous consideration of the merits of the cause.” Brailsford, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 406.  Section 
47 of Title 28 arguably forbids such a practice today: “No judge shall hear or determine an 
appeal from the decision of a case or issue tried by him.”  28 U.S.C. § 47 (2006). 
96. Brailsford, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 406-09. 
97. Id. at 405, 408 (Cushing, J. & Johnson, J., dissenting).  Many years later, lower 
federal courts, with or without citation, quoted or paraphrased Justice Johnson’s statement in 
dissent: “In order to support a motion for an injunction, the bill should set forth a case of 
probable right, and a probable danger that the right would be defeated, without this special 
interposition of the court.”  Id.; e.g., Lundgrin v. Claytor, 619 F.2d 61, 63 (l0th Cir. 1980) 
(citing Crowther v. Seaborg, 415 F.2d 437, 439 (l0th Cir. 1969)). 
98. Brailsford, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 405, 408. 
99. Section l6 provided “[t]hat suits in equity shall not be sustained in either of the 
courts of the United States, in any case where plain, adequate and complete remedy may be 
had at law.”  1 Stat. 73 (1789).  In 1948 when Congress revised the Judicial Code, it 
eliminated this provision.  See Herbert Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the 
Judicial Code, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 216 (1948). 
100. Brailsford, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 415. 
101. Id. at 419.  In his separate opinion, Justice Blair identified apprehension that 
Brailsford, a British subject, would take the money and run (to England) as the factor 
animating the issuance of the original injunction.  Id. at 418. 
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plaintiff had an adequate remedy at law, the injunction would continue 
because “the money ought to be kept [under the control of the Court] for 
the party to whom it belongs.”102  He did not identify any standards to 
govern the issuance or continuation of preliminary injunctions. 
In denying the defendants’ motion to dissolve the temporary 
injunction, the Court conditioned the continuance of the injunction upon 
Georgia commencing its action at law before the next term of the 
Court.103  The following year in 1794, the Supreme Court conducted a 
jury trial in Georgia v. Brailsford on the plaintiff's claim under the 
Georgia confiscation statute.104  When the jury returned a verdict for the 
defendants, the British creditors, the Court dissolved the temporary 
injunction.105 
Since the 1792 decision in Georgia v. Brailsford,106 the federal 
courts have struggled with the standards to be applied to requests for 
temporary injunctive relief.  Until its 2008 decision in Winter v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council,107 the Supreme Court had not definitively 
stated the criteria for the issuance of preliminary injunctions.  For the 
most part, it had left the matter to the courts of appeals, which developed 
a variety of standards.108 
English equity practice provided some guideposts in the nineteenth 
century.  At least as early as 1792, the Supreme Court by rule stated that 
English equity practice would guide its proceedings.109  Under the 
Federal Equity Rules in effect from 1822 to 1912, the Supreme Court 
directed the lower federal courts to employ the “practice of the High 
Court of Chancery in England” to fill gaps in the law governing federal 
equity jurisdiction.110  In several nineteenth century decisions, the Court 
absorbed the principles of the English Chancery into federal law.111 
The Equity Rules of l912 did not have a comparable reference to 
102. Id. at 418-19. 
103. Id. at 419. 
104. Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 1 (1794). 
105. Id. at 5. 
106. Brailsford, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 402 (1792). 
107. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7 (2008). 
108. See generally Wolf, supra note 13, at 173. 
109. Brailsford, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 411-14.  Fifty years later, Supreme Court Reporter 
Benjamin C. Howard reported that rule, in slightly different form, as having been promulgated 
a year earlier on August 8, 1791.  42 U.S. (1 How.) xxiv (1842). 
110. See Rule 33, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) vii, xiii (1822); Rule 90, 42 U.S. (1 How.) xxxix, 
lxix (1842). 
111. See, e.g., Penn. v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518, 563-
64 (1856); Robinson v. Campbell, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 212, 222-23 (1818). 
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the English law of equity.112  Much more recently, though, the Court, in 
2008, restated the proposition that the law of equity, including 
preliminary injunctions, in the federal courts is guided by the equitable 
principles extant in England.113  Sometimes it has referred specifically to 
the English High Court of Chancery at the time of the ratification of the 
Constitution in 1788 and the passage of the Judiciary Act in 1789.114  
Notwithstanding the references to English equity, the federal courts soon 
began developing their own criteria to govern motions for interlocutory 
injunctions. 
In their quest for appropriate standards, the Supreme Court and the 
courts of appeals have not followed consistent paths through the maze of 
interlocutory relief.  The federal appellate courts have not been 
especially attentive to Supreme Court decisions, and the Court itself has 
not been especially attentive to the need for uniform criteria. 
B. Supreme Court Decisions 
Prior to the 2008 decision in Winter v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council,115 the opinions of the Supreme Court regarding the standards 
for issuing preliminary injunctions could be described as inattentive.  
Although the Court has reviewed many orders granting or denying 
preliminary injunctions,116 it has not established hard and fast rules 
regarding their issuance.  On the occasions when the court has addressed 
the criteria, it has done so somewhat casually and largely without regard 
for the varying standards followed by the lower federal courts and 
indeed by the Court itself.  Furthermore, the Court has not used its prior 
precedents regularly in developing standards.  This casualness perhaps 
accounts for the reality that the lower federal courts, prior to Winter, 
have barely given nodding recognition to the Supreme Court opinions 
regarding interlocutory injunctions.  At best, the Supreme Court 
precedents have served as points of departure for federal appellate 
decisions, which quickly move in other directions. 
1. Early Precedents 
After the 1792 decision in Brailsford, the Supreme Court said very 
112. 226 U.S. 629 (1912). 
113. Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 691 (2008). 
114. Grupo Mexico de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 318 
(1999). 
115. 555 U.S. 7 (2008). 
116. In the past 15 years, the Supreme Court has reviewed over 100 civil actions 
involving preliminary injunctions.  It has explored the parameters of the standards for such 
relief in only seven of them. 
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little about the standards for preliminary injunctions117 until 1882, when 
the Court broke its 90-year silence.  In Russell v. Farley, the Court in 
dictum commented on the criteria for issuing temporary injunctions.118  
It noted that a federal court might order interim relief even if the 
movant’s claim is legally in doubt.119  Where the movant’s legal right is 
doubtful, she may still secure a temporary injunction by showing that 
she will suffer greater harm if the injunction is denied than the opposing 
party will suffer if it is granted.120 
In support of this legal proposition, the Court cited Injunctions in 
Equity (1871), a popular treatise by William W. Kerr, a British 
lawyer.121  The treatise largely examined English precedents on which 
the Supreme Court relied in the nineteenth century.122  Indeed the 
Supreme Court still relies on English equity practice,123 including 
principles extant at the time of the adoption of the Constitution in 1788 
and the enactment of the first Judiciary Act in 1789.124 
Although the statement in Russell was dictum, it appears to reflect 
accurately then current standards for preliminary injunctions.125  That is, 
117. In several cases, the Court, without discussing applicable standards, approved the 
issuance of temporary injunctions, as in Brailsford, to preserve property until an action at law 
could settle the dispute on the merits, e.g., King v. Hamilton, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 311 (1830); 
Parker v. Judges of the Circuit Court of Md., 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 561 (1827); or to restrain 
execution of a judgment at law pending resolution of an equitable defense, e.g., Horsburg v. 
Baker, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 232 (1828).  In Parker v. Winnipiseogee Lake Cotton and Woolen Co., 
67 U.S. (2 Bl.) 545, 552 (1863), a case involving a permanent or “perpetual” injunction, the 
Court stated in dictum that the party seeking preliminary relief to preserve property pending 
trial of a civil action at law would have to show “a strong prima facie case of right” and 
irreparable injury. 
118. Russell v. Farley, 105 U.S. 433, 439 (1881). 
119. Id. at 438 (nothing that the court is reluctant to take a course which may injure 
either party when the claim is legally doubtful). 
120. Id. 
121. Id. at 438-39. 
122. At least as early as 1792, the Supreme Court by rule stated that English equity 
practice would guide its proceedings.  See Case of Hayburn, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792).  
Under the Federal Equity Rules in effect from 1822 to 1912, the Supreme Court directed the 
lower federal courts to employ the “practice of the High Court of Chancery in England” to fill 
gaps in the law governing federal equity jurisdiction.  See Rule 33, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) v, xiii 
(1822); Rule 90, 42 U.S. (1 How.) xxxix, lxix (1842).  The equity rules of l912 did not have a 
comparable rule.  226 U.S. 629 (19l2). 
123. See Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 691 (2008) (applying England’s practice as a 
reason for its ruling in another case). 
124. See Grupo Mexico de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 
318 (1999). 
125. See J. HIGH, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF INJUNCTIONS § 13 (Chicago, Callaghan 
& Co. 1873); CHARLES F. BEACH JR., COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF INJUNCTIONS § 20 
(n.p. 1894); see generally John Leubsdorf, The Standards for Preliminary Injunctions, 91 
HARV. L. REV. 525 (1978); Note, Developments in the Law—Injunctions, 78 HARV. L. REV. 
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if the movant could demonstrate a clear legal right, “plain and free from 
doubt,”126 the injunction would issue.  In the alternative, if the legal right 
were in doubt, then the movant would have to show a balance of 
hardships in her favor.127  The Kerr treatise, however, also reflected a 
second alternative standard for preliminary relief: (1) a showing of a 
prima facie case; and (2) a showing of irreparable injury, that is, an 
injury that cannot be remedied with money damages.128  Neither Russell 
nor other Supreme Court precedents in the nineteenth century reflected 
this second alternative test for issuance of preliminary injunctions. 
The application of the second alternative test emerged definitively 
in the early part of the twentieth century in the wake of Ex parte 
Young.129  The Young decision restated the view that state officials could 
be sued to enjoin enforcement of state statutes without violating state 
sovereign immunity from suit in federal court embodied in the Eleventh 
amendment.130  That decision animated a number of suits challenging 
state regulatory statutes as violating the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.131 
In the wake of the Young decision, Congress enacted the three-
judge court statute, which sought to prevent a single federal judge from 
enjoining state regulatory statutes.132  Because decisions granting or 
denying preliminary injunctions were appealable directly to the Supreme 
Court, the high tribunal had numerous opportunities to review the 
standards for interlocutory relief. 
In the Young case, as well as in the decisions following it, the 
Supreme Court held that preliminary injunctions should not issue to 
restrain the enforcement of state statutes unless the case was “reasonably 
free from doubt” and only to prevent “great and irreparable injury.”133  
994 (1965). 
126. WILLIAM W. KERR, A TREATISE ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF INJUNCTIONS IN 
EQUITY 220 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1871); see also Phoenix Ry. Co. v. Geary, 239 
U.S. 277 (1915) (stating that to enjoin preliminarily the operation of a state statute, the 
plaintiff must show a clear constitutional violation). 
127. See KERR, supra note 126 at 221-22. 
128. Id. at 208.  See generally Leubsdorf, supra note 125 at 530-31. 
129. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (l908). 
130. Id. at 159-60. 
131. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 7.5.1 (Aspen 6th ed. 2012); 
see also WRIGHT AND KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 48 (West 7th ed. 2011). 
132. Act of June 18, 1910, Pub. L. No. 218, § 17, 36 Stat. 539, 557 (1910).  In 1976 
Congress largely repealed the three-judge district court statute. 
133. Young, 209 U.S. at 166-67; accord, Mass. State Grange v. Benton, 272 U.S. 525, 
527 (1926) (citing Cavanaugh v. Looney, 248 U.S. 453, 456 (1919)); see Foster-Fountain 
Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1, 5 (1928); see also Mayo v. Lakeland Highlands Canning 
Co., 309 U.S. 310, 316-19 (1940). 
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Although it appeared by the early 1920’s that the Court had settled on 
these standards, it still exhibited some variation in its application.  In 
1923, relying on the Kerr treatise134 once again, the Supreme Court, in a 
challenge to a state rate-making order, upheld a preliminary injunction 
because a balancing of the hardships favored the plaintiff and because 
the moving party had posted a sufficient bond.135 
As the Court moved further into the twentieth century, it appeared 
to be drawing a distinction between private cases and public cases.  That 
is, the Court would apply a stricter set of criteria for preliminary relief 
when the plaintiff sought to enjoin governmental (state or federal) action 
than when the litigation involved only private interests and private 
parties.136  The SJC has adopted this distinction in its decisions as well 
although not with consistent standards.137 
In succeeding years, the Supreme Court continued its meandering 
course through various tests and criteria, which, singularly or in 
combination, could have formed the basis for a consistent standard for 
issuing preliminary injunctions.  In 1939, for example, the Court 
emphasized, apparently for the first time, the need to evaluate the impact 
of a preliminary injunction on the public interest where the plaintiff 
seeks to enjoin an order of a federal agency.138  That same year, in a case 
challenging the validity of a state statute, the Court identified three 
prerequisites for injunctive relief: grave doubts as to the constitutionality 
of the statute; irreparable harm to the movant; and posting of a bond.139  
It did not discuss the balancing of hardships or the public interest factors 
noted in earlier cases. 
134. KERR, supra note 126. 
135. Prendergast v. New York Tel. Co., 262 U.S. 43 (1923).  In 1934, Congress enacted 
the Johnson Act to prevent the federal courts from unduly interfering in state rate-making.  
See 28 U.S.C. § 1342 (2006).  In 1937, Congress enacted the Tax Injunction Act to prevent 
the federal courts from unduly interfering in state tax collection.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1341 
(2006); see also Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat’l Bank, 450 U.S. 503 (1981). 
136. Compare Young, 209 U.S. at 123 (suit to enjoin state action) with Rice & Adams 
Corp. v. Lathrop, 278 U.S. 509 (1929) (private suit to enjoin patent infringement). 
137. See infra Part II.C (discussing the “public interest” as a factor in preliminary 
relief). 
138. Inland Steel Co. v. United States, 306 U.S. 153, 157 (1939).  Two years earlier, the 
Court had noted the relevance of the public interest in granting or withholding permanent 
injunctive relief.  Virginian Ry. Co. v. System Fed’n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 552 (1937). 
139. Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U.S. 66, 76-77, 94 (1939).  See Mayo v. Lakeland Highlands 
Canning Co., 309 U.S. 310, 318-19 (1940) (the Court in Mayo appeared to adopt two different 
sets of criteria: one would allow a preliminary injunction if the movant showed irreparable 
injury and raised “serious questions” regarding the constitutionality of the challenged statute, 
while the other would require “a clear and persuasive showing of unconstitutionality and 
irreparable injury”). 
 
WOLF FINAL 51313 7/13/2013  12:58 PM 
22 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:1 
2. Contemporary Standards 
Until its November 2008 decision in Winter v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council,140 the Supreme Court, in recent years, has not done 
much better to articulate consistent standards for the issuance of 
preliminary injunctions.  It provided very little guidance to the lower 
federal courts through the adoption of consistent and uniform standards 
for the issuance of preliminary injunctions.  For example, over a period 
of fifteen years, the Court had numerous opportunities to clarify the 
standards for preliminary relief, but it failed to do so.141 
Between 1973 and 1975, for example, the Court discussed the 
criteria for interlocutory relief in at least four different ways.  In Brown 
v. Chote,142 the Court identified a two-factor test: the moving party must 
show (1) the “possibilities” of success on the merits; and (2) the 
“possibility” of irreparable injury if the relief is denied.143 
The following year, the Court repeated the two-factor test, but 
phrased it as a “likelihood of success on the merits,” and a “likelihood of 
irreparable injury,”144 not simply the "possibility.”145  At its next term, 
the Court added a third factor to the test for preliminary relief, but did 
not apply it to the pending case.  In addition to showing a likelihood of 
success on the merits and irreparable injury, the trial court must also 
“weigh carefully the interests on both sides.”146  In these three cases, the 
Court said nothing about the public interest. 
In the fourth case in this span of three years, the Supreme Court 
referred to the public interest factor, which it had earlier mentioned as an 
element in evaluating the need for preliminary injunctions.147  In 
Sampson v. Murray, a probationary employee, who had been dismissed 
from her job with a federal agency, successfully secured preliminary 
relief from the district court pending a hearing before the Civil Service 
140. 555 U.S. 7 (2008). 
141. Between 1994 and 2009, the Supreme Court reviewed over 100 civil actions in this 
span of 15 years, which involved varying standards for preliminary injunctions, discussing the 
appropriate standards for temporary injunctive relief in only seven of them.  Winter settled the 
matter. 
142. 411 U.S. 452 (1973); cf. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 45 (1975) (applying the 
same two factors, although phrasing one as a “high” probability of success on the merits). 
143. Brown, 411 U.S. at 456. 
144. Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Teamsters, 415 U.S. 423, 441 (1974). 
145. In Winter, 555 U.S. at 22, the Court expressly rejected the “possibility” standard as 
“too lenient,” holding that the correct standard is “likelihood” of success on the merits. 
146. Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 931 (1975). 
147. Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61 (1974); see Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 
414, 441-42 (1944); Inland Steel Co. v. United States, 306 U.S. 153, 157 (1939); Virginian 
Ry. Co. v. Sys. Fed’n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 552 (1937). 
 
WOLF FINAL 51313 7/13/2013  12:58 PM 
2013] PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION STANDARDS 23 
Commission.148 
In Sampson, the Court assumed the vitality of and apparently 
adopted the four-factor test that the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit developed in Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass’n v. 
Federal Power Commission:149 (l) the moving party must make a strong 
showing of likely success on the merits; (2) the petitioner must 
demonstrate that, in the absence of the injunction, she will suffer 
irreparable injury; (3) the movant must show that other parties interested 
in the proceeding will not be substantially harmed by the injunction; and 
(4) the public interest must be evaluated.150  Because the case involved a 
government personnel decision, the Court rejected the routine 
application of these four factors on a motion for a preliminary 
injunction, holding that such criteria, especially irreparable injury, must 
be applied more stringently.151  Despite the Supreme Court’s reference 
to the four-factor test in Sampson, the courts of appeals continued to go 
their own ways.152 
3. The Winter Decision 
In Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the Court 
finally focused on the criteria for the grant or denial of preliminary 
injunctions.153  There, the Natural Resources Defense Council sued to 
enjoin the United States Navy from using “mid-frequency active sonar” 
in the waters off Southern California.154  It alleged that such sonar 
caused serious harm to some species of marine mammals.155  Using a 
“sliding scale” approach it had used for many years, the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals affirmed the grant of preliminary relief, ruling that the 
plaintiff had made a strong showing on the likelihood of prevailing on 
the merits and a “possibility” of irreparable harm.156 
148. Sampson, 415 U.S. at 63. 
149. 259 F.2d 921, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (per curiam). 
150. Sampson, 415 U.S. at 84 n.53. 
151. Id. at 88-92. 
152. See generally Wolf, supra note 13. 
153. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 22-23 (2008). 
154. Id. at 13-14. 
155. Id. 
156. Id. at 19-20.  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals never referred to Granny Goose 
Foods, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Teamsters, 415 U.S. 423, 441 (1974) or other prior Supreme 
Court precedents that used the word “likelihood” rather than “possibility” to define the level 
of showing needed to secure the preliminary injunction.  This is another example of a lower 
federal court ignoring precedents because the Court itself, until recently, had not paid detailed 
and studious attention to the matter. 
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The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the Court of Appeals.157  
First, it noted that a temporary injunction is “an extraordinary remedy 
never awarded as of right.”158  Second, the Court added that a trial court 
should grant preliminary relief only upon a “clear showing” that the 
moving party is entitled to it.159  Third, the Court identified the four 
factors the trial court must consider in evaluating requests for temporary 
injunctions.160  It ruled that the moving party “must establish that he is 
likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable 
harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips 
in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.”161  Although 
the Court cited prior decisions162 for this four-factor test, in fact it had 
never expressly and clearly so ruled in unmistakable language prior to its 
decision in Winter.  At least the lower federal courts did not think so.163 
The Court then addressed the question whether it should affirm the 
issuance of the preliminary injunction.   First, it noted that the appellate 
court had incorrectly required only a showing of “possible” irreparable 
injury, which the Court noted is “too lenient.”164  The correct standard is 
“likelihood” of irreparable injury.  It then ruled that the plaintiff had not 
demonstrated the public interest would not be adversely affected.165  In 
fact, the Court observed, the national defense would be seriously 
impaired, and courts should defer to the military’s assessment of the 
dangers to the public interest if the injunction is granted.166 
When the non-moving party defendant is a government, the inquiry 
into the harm to that party and the harm to the public interest is the same 
inquiry because the government represents the public interest.167  
Finally, the Court declined to rule on the likelihood of success factor as 
157. Winter, 555 U.S. at 33. 
158. Id. at 24. 
159. Id. 
160. Id. at 22. 
161. Id. at 20. 
162. The Court cited Munaf v. Geren, 128 S. Ct. 2207 (2008), Amoco Production Co. v. 
Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 542 (1987), and Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311-
12 (1982). 
163. See generally Wolf, supra note 13. 
164. Winter, 555 U.S. at 22. 
165. Id. at 26-27. 
166. Id. at 27. 
167. Id. at 26-31.  Cf. Nken v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1749, 1761-62 (2009) (ruling on an 
application for a stay pending appeal, the Court noted that the four “stay” factors are nearly 
identical to the four criteria for preliminary injunctions, and the harm to the non-movant and 
the public interest factors “merge when the Government is the opposing party”).  This author 
recommended such a merger 26 years ago.  See generally Wolf, supra note 13. 
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unnecessary because the plaintiff had failed to satisfy the other factors.  
Whether the Court will apply this four-factor analysis, including the 
public interest criterion, when none of the parties to the litigation is a 
governmental entity remains to be seen, although the lower federal 
courts have done so in the wake of Winter.168 
The Winter decision has already impacted the standards for 
granting preliminary injunctions applied in the lower federal courts, 
unlike prior Supreme Court decisions which seemed to have had little 
effect on the development of the standards for temporary relief.  For 
example, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals began applying Winter 
immediately, notwithstanding its prior criteria.  “To the extent that our 
cases have suggested a lesser standard, they are no longer controlling, or 
even viable.”169  Prior to Winter, the Ninth Circuit allowed the grant of a 
preliminary injunction if the plaintiff demonstrated either: 
(1) [A] likelihood of success on the merits and the possibility of 
irreparable injury; or (2) that serious questions going to the merits 
were raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in its favor.  
These two alternatives represent extremes of a single continuum, 
rather than two separate tests.  Thus, the greater the relative hardship 
to the party seeking the preliminary injunction, the less probability 
of success must be shown.170 
Winter dramatically altered these previous standards in the Ninth 
Circuit and elsewhere.171   Its full impact on the standards for granting or 
denying preliminary injunctions is not yet fully known, but the 
handwriting is clearly on the wall. 
Finally, the Supreme Court in Winter suggested that a moving party 
may have to make a heightened showing if that party is seeking an 
168. See, e.g., cases cited infra note 171. 
169. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Los Angeles, 559 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir. 2009).  
Accord South Fork Band Council v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 588 F.3d 718, 721 (9th Cir. 2009); 
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 587 F.3d 966, 973-74 (9th Cir. 2009). 
170. Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 571 F.3d 960, 977 (9th Cir. 2009), vacated, 586 F.3d 
1109 (9th Cir. 2009) 
171. See Hoosier Energy Rural Elec. Coop., Inc. v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 582 
F.3d 721, 725 (7th Cir. 2009) (applying the four Winter factors); Real Truth About Obama v. 
FEC, 575 F.3d 342, 346-47 (4th Cir. 2009) (stating Winter overrules prior Circuit precedents); 
Titan Tire Corp. v. Case New Holland, Inc., 566 F.3d 1372, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (applying 
Winter’s four-factor analysis, observing it is the “longstanding and universal” test); Attorney 
Gen. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 565 F.3d 769, 776 (10th Cir. 2009) (applying the four Winter 
factors); RoDa Drilling Co. v. Siegal, 552 F.3d 1203, 1208 (10th Cir. 2009) (same).  Cf. Davis 
v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 571 F.3d 1288, 1292 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (following the four-
factor test in Winter, but stating the Court did not expressly reject prior circuit precedents 
applying a “sliding scale” standard). 
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affirmative (or mandatory) preliminary injunction as compared to a 
prohibitory injunction.172  Federal courts of appeals have read the 
decision in that fashion.173  In 2000, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
had ruled that the test is “more vigorous” for an affirmative injunction, 
requiring the moving party to demonstrate “a clear and substantial” 
likelihood of succeeding on the merits.174  Although the First Circuit has 
not yet, in the wake of Winter, addressed the question whether 
heightened standards apply to affirmative preliminary injunctions, it has 
ruled that temporary mandatory relief may be necessary to protect the 
status quo and prevent irreparable injury until a trial on the merits.175 
The affirmative injunction is usually in the form of “thou shalt,” 
while the prohibitory injunction takes the form of “thou shalt not.”  The 
line is not always clear between the two forms of injunctions.  Through 
the use of the “double negative” order, a court will sometimes enter an 
injunction that looks like a prohibitory injunction but in fact is an 
affirmative (or mandatory) injunction: “The defendant is hereby 
enjoined from failing or refusing to remove the tool shed that trespasses 
upon plaintiff's property,” or “the defendant is hereby enjoined from 
failing or refusing to sell its product to the plaintiff on the same terms 
and conditions as it sells that product to plaintiff’s competitors.” 
C. First Circuit Court of Appeals176 
1. Overview 
Historically, the United States courts of appeals have differed 
widely in their approaches to preliminary relief.177  The First Circuit is 
not an exception.  While there is some cross-pollination between and 
among the courts of appeals, they essentially have developed their own 
172. Winter, 555 U.S. at 24. 
173. See Tyson Foods, Inc., 565 F.3d 769; RoDa Drilling Co., 552 F.3d 1203; see also 
Tunick v. Safir, 209 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 2000). 
174. Tunick, 209 F.3d at 85. 
175. Crowley v. Local No. 82 Furniture and Piano Moving, 679 F.2d 978 (1st Cir. 
1982), rev’d on other grounds, 467 U.S. 526 (1984). 
176. Congress created this court in 1891 when it established nine circuit courts of 
appeals. 26 Stat. 826 (1891) (commonly referred to as the Evarts Act or the Circuit Court of 
Appeals Act of 1891).  In 1948, Congress changed the official name of the court from the 
“Circuit Court of Appeals” to the “Court of Appeals.” 28 U.S.C. § 43(a) (2006).  It is not 
technically correct to refer to a Court of Appeals as the “Circuit Court” (formerly a federal 
court with original and appellate jurisdiction, which Congress abolished in 1911) or as the 
“Circuit Court of Appeals,” which Congress abolished in 1948 when it changed the name of 
the court. 
177. See generally Wolf, supra note 13. 
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criteria.  Their decisions have largely been characterized by inconsistent 
articulation and application of standards. 
Before the Supreme Court’s November 2008 decision in Winter v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council,178 the federal appellate courts had 
used at least nine different tests, excluding variations, for interlocutory 
relief.179  Other than an en banc decision in the Eighth Circuit,180 no 
federal appellate court has convened specifically to reconcile these 
differences. 
Furthermore, while the federal courts have developed various 
criteria based on their inherent judicial powers, they have also 
recognized special criteria for certain statutory and constitutional claims, 
creating additional confusion in the search for uniform standards.181  In 
addition, while the federal appellate courts have not been especially 
attentive to Supreme Court precedents involving interlocutory 
injunctions, the First Circuit has, on occasion, cited to and even relied on 
Supreme Court decisions.182 
2. Traditional Standards 
In one of its early cases over seventy years ago,183 the First Circuit, 
contrary to other courts of appeals, followed the decision of the Supreme 
Court in Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway.184  In Munoz v. Porto Rico Ry. Light 
& Power Co., the court, relying on Conway, held that the plaintiff could 
secure preliminary relief if it raised serious questions going to the merits, 
and if the balance of hardships tipped toward the moving party.185  In 
178. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7 (2008). 
179. See generally Wolf, supra note 13. 
180. See Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C L Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 112 (8th Cir. 1981) (en 
banc). 
181. See, e.g., Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61 (1974) (federal employment matters); 
V.N.A. of Greater Tift County, Inc. v. Heckler, 711 F.2d 1020 (11th Cir. 1983) (Medicare 
reimbursement payments), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 936 (1984); Corbin v. Texaco, Inc., 690 
F.2d 104 (6th Cir. 1982) (petroleum marketing practices); Deerfield Med. Ctr. v. City of 
Deerfield Beach, 661 F.2d 328 (5th Cir. 1981) (First Amendment claim); Middleton-Keirn v. 
Stone, 655 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1981) (employment discrimination); Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. 
Co. v. Lennen, 640 F.2d 255 (10th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (state taxation of railroads). 
182. See, e.g., National Tank Truck Carriers, Inc. v. Burke, 608 F.2d 819, 823-25 (1st 
Cir. 1979) (citing Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975)); Celebrity, Inc. v. Trina, 
Inc., 264 F.2d 956 (1st Cir. 1959) (citing Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, 279 U.S. 813 (1929) (per 
curiam)). 
183. Munoz v. Porto Rico Ry. Light & Power Co., 83 F.2d 262, 268 (1st Cir. 1936). 
184. Conway, 279 U.S. 813 (per curiam); see also Celebrity, 264 F.2d at 958 (relying 
on Conway for the proposition that the moving party must show irreparable injury to secure a 
preliminary injunction); Hannan v. City of Haverhill, 120 F.2d 87, 90 (1st Cir. 1941) (same). 
185. Munoz, 83 F.2d at 269. 
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addition the court stated that posting a bond would be a useful device to 
prevent injury if the harm to the nonmoving party were more than 
“inconsiderable.”186  By the late l960s, however, the court had moved to 
a two-factor analysis for interim relief: likelihood of success on the 
merits and immediate irreparable injury,187 ignoring its earlier view 
expressed in Munoz.188 
In the 1970’s, the First Circuit expanded its test for preliminary 
relief by adding two other elements: (1) a balancing of the hardships to 
the parties;189 and (2) a public interest factor.190  Thus by the end of l978, 
the First Circuit Court of Appeals had adopted a full-blown four-factor 
test for interlocutory injunctions.191  But the apparent adoption of the 
four-factor approach in 1978 did not result in consistent application of it. 
In 1979, the First Circuit applied a three-factor analysis, relying on 
a Supreme Court case decided in 1975.192  Two years later the court 
186. Id. 
187. See, e.g., Automatic Radio Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 390 F.2d 113, 116 
(1st Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 914 (1968); accord Interco, Inc. v. First Nat’l Bank of 
Boston, 560 F.2d 480, 482 (1st Cir. 1977); Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359, 360-61 (1st Cir. 
1969).  In the Automatic Radio case, the court also suggested a sliding scale approach: a 
"strong" showing of probability of success might lessen the burden on the movant to 
demonstrate irreparable injury.  Automatic Radio, 390 F.2d. at 116.  In a footnote, the court 
also referred offhandedly to the public interest.  Id. at 116 n.4. 
188. 83 F.2d 262 (1st Cir. 1936). 
189. See, e.g., SEC v. World Radio Mission, Inc., 544 F.2d 535, 541-42 (1st Cir. 1976); 
Int’l Ass’n of Machinist & Aerospace Workers v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 473 F.2d 549, 553-
54 (1st Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 845 (1972).  In the SEC case, the court also 
suggested a sliding scale approach indicated in Automatic Radio without citing to it.  554 F.2d 
at 546.  With regard to the balancing factor, the court has usually required only that the 
weighing of hardships favors the moving party.  In at least one instance, however, it has 
declined to allow a preliminary injunction because the movant failed to show that the balance 
"tips sufficiently" in her direction.  Burgess v. Affleck, 683 F.2d 596, 601 (1st Cir. 1982).  
Although the First Circuit had used a balancing test in earlier decisions, it made no reference 
to them in these cases. 
190. Grimard v. Carlston, 567 F.2d 1171, 1173 (1st Cir. 1978).  Although the First 
Circuit in recent years has generally adhered to the four criteria approach for interlocutory 
relief, it has on occasion omitted any reference to the public interest factor.  E.g., Doe v. 
Brookline Sch. Comm., 722 F.2d 910 (1st Cir. 1983); Rushia v. Town of Ashburnham, 701 
F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1983); Mass. Ass’n of Older Ams. v. Sharp, 700 F.2d 749 (1st Cir. 1983); see 
also Nat’l Tank Truck Carriers, Inc. v. Burke, 608 F.2d 819 (1st Cir. 1979). 
191. Levesque v. Maine, 587 F.2d 78, 80 (1st Cir. 1978). 
192. Nat’l Tank Truck Carriers, Inc., 608 F.2d at 823-25 (citing Doran v. Salem Inn, 
Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975)); see also Engine Specialties, Inc. v. Bombardier, Ltd., 454 F.2d 
527, 530-31 (1st Cir. 1972).  Without clearly articulating any standards, the court apparently 
applied three factors for interim relief: likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm, 
and balance of hardships.  Bombardier, 454 F.2d at 530-31.  While relying on Doran in 
Burke, the court of appeals ignored Doran the previous year when it announced the four-
factor test discussed above, and in 1981, the court read Doran as imposing a two-factor 
analysis.  Maceira v. Pagan, 649 F.2d 8, 15 (1st Cir. 1981).  In 1983, however, it interpreted 
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restated and applied the four-factor approach in the leading case of 
Planned Parenthood League of Massachusetts v. Bellotti.193  Within 
three months of Bellotti, however, the First Circuit reverted momentarily 
to its earlier two-factor analysis (irreparable injury and probable success 
on the merits).194  But within two weeks, it returned to the four-factor 
analysis of Bellotti.195 
Although the Court of Appeals in Bellotti did not discuss any of its 
prior suggestions regarding the “sliding scale” modification of the four-
factor test, it did address that question three months later in 
Massachusetts Coalition of Citizens with Disabilities v. Civil Defense 
Agency.196  After reaffirming the four elements of its newly restated 
standards for interim relief,197 the court addressed the assertion that a 
sliding scale should be applied to that analysis.198  Relying on the 
decision of the Fourth Circuit in the Blackwelder case,199 the First 
Doran again to require a three criteria approach.  Rushia v. Town of Ashburnham, 701 F.2d 7, 
9-10 (1st Cir. 1983). 
193. 641 F.2d 1006 (1st Cir. 1981).  In fact, the court quoted from a 1979 district court 
decision that purported to recite the four elements recognized in the First Circuit.  Id. at 1009 
(quoting Women’s Cmty. Health Ctr. Inc. v. Cohen, 477 F. Supp. 542, 544 (D. Me. 1979)).  
The court did not seek to synthesize or rely on its own prior decisions, nor those of the 
Supreme Court.  In addition, the court made no reference to its prior suggestions regarding the 
sliding scale approach. 
194. Maceira, 649 F.2d at 8.  Interestingly, in this case, the court cited the Doran 
opinion as supporting the two-factor approach, even though it had cited Doran two years 
earlier for the three-factor test in Nat’l Tank Truck, 649 F.2d at 15; see also Doe, 722 F.2d 910 
(applying a two-factor analysis, although it may be linked to the statutory remedy involved in 
that case). 
195. Mass. Coalition of Citizens with Disabilities v. Civil Def. Agency, 649 F.2d 71, 
74-76 (1st Cir. 1981).  While generally requiring the moving party to satisfy each of the four 
elements, id., the court has deviated, as the text indicates, from a strict application of that rule.  
In one case, it even waived proof on two of the four factors when the court ruled on the legal 
contentions of the parties, notwithstanding many prior statements to the contrary that the 
merits are not to be addressed on a motion for preliminary relief.  Wald v. Regan, 708 F.2d 
794, 801 (1st Cir. 1983), rev’d on other grounds, 468 U.S. 222 (1984).  In reversing the 
judgment of the First Circuit, the Supreme Court did not mention the unorthodox reaching of 
the merits on motion for an interlocutory injunction, perhaps because the Court itself has done 
that on occasion, see Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674 (2008); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), despite its warnings to the contrary in, for example, Mayo v. 
Lakeland Highlands Canning Co., 309 U.S. 310, 316 (1940).  See also University of Texas v. 
Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390 (1981).  As noted earlier, nineteenth Century English and American 
practice authorized the issuance of a temporary injunction if the moving party showed a “clear 
title or right.”  Wald and Sawyer are reminiscent of that earlier doctrine, as is American 
Eutectic Welding Alloys Sales Co., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 480 F.2d 223 (1st Cir. 1973). 
196. 649 F.2d at 74 (1st Cir. 1981).  Although the court restated the four-factor analysis 
of Bellotti, it failed to cite that case, relying on earlier, less explicit precedents. 
197. Id. 
198. Id. at 75. 
199. Blackwelder Furniture Co. of Statesville, Inc. v. Seilig Mfg. Co., 550 F.2d 189 
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Circuit held that the irreparable injury and probable success factors bear 
an inverse relationship.200  A greater showing on one reduces the 
showing necessary on the other.  In Massachusetts Coalition, the court 
found that the plaintiff had shown only a “possible” injury, necessitating 
an examination of “likelihood of success” to determine if the showing 
was strong enough to compensate for the weaker showing on irreparable 
injury.201 
Despite its earlier suggestions regarding the sliding scale 
approach202 and despite its holding in Massachusetts Coalition, the First 
Circuit has rarely mentioned the concept since 1978.203  Indeed in 
numerous cases, the court, in reviewing applications for interim relief, 
has made no reference at all to the sliding scale variation.204  
Furthermore, in other cases, it has implicitly rejected the sliding scale 
analysis by affirming a denial of interim relief because the movant had 
failed to show either irreparable injury,205 probable success on the 
merits,206 or both.207 
(4th Cir. 1977).  In light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Winter the Fourth Circuit has 
abandoned its “sliding scale” approach.  Real Truth About Obama v. FEC, 575 F.3d 342 (4th 
Cir. 2009).  But cf. Davis v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 571 F.3d 1288 (D.C. Cir. 2009) 
(following the four-factor test in Winter, but stating the Court did not expressly reject prior 
Circuit precedents applying a “sliding scale” standard). 
200. Mass. Coalition of Citizens with Disabilities, 649 F.2d at 75. 
201. Id. 
202. See supra notes 191-198 and accompanying text. 
203. See Mass. Ass’n of Older Ams. v. Sharp, 700 F.2d 749 (1st Cir. 1983) (mentioning 
sliding scale, but not applying it); Auburn News Co., Inc. v. Providence Journal Co., 659 F.2d 
273 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 921 (1982) (passing reference to sliding scale). 
204. E.g., New Comm Wireless Servs., Inc. v. SprintCom, Inc., 287 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 
2002); Martinez v. R.I. Hous. & Mortgage Fin. Corp., 738 F.2d 21 (1st Cir. 1984); Kenworth 
of Boston, Inc. v. Paccar Fin. Corp., 735 F.2d 622 (1st Cir. 1984); Massachusetts v. Watt, 716 
F.2d 946 (1st Cir. 1983); LeBeau v. Spirito, 703 F.2d 639 (1st Cir. 1983); S.F. Real Estate 
Investors v. Real Estate Inv. Trust of Am., 701 F.2d 1000 (1st Cir. 1983); Rushia v. Town of 
Ashburnham, 701 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1983); Crowley v. Local No. 82 Furniture and Piano 
Moving, 679 F.2d 978 (1st Cir. 1982), rev’d on other grounds, 467 U.S. 526 (1984); Burgess 
v. Affleck, 683 F.2d 596 (1st Cir. 1982); Mass. Ass’n for Retarded Citizens, Inc. v. King, 668 
F.2d 602 (1st Cir. 1981); Town of Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ., 655 F.2d 428 (1st Cir. 1981); 
see also Lynch v. Dukakis, 719 F.2d 504 (1st Cir. 1983) (containing no discussion of either 
the four criteria or the sliding scale variation). 
205. E.g., Rushia, 701 F.2d at 10 (affirming denial of interlocutory injunction because 
movant failed to show irreparable injury); Town of Burlington v. Dep't of Educ., 655 F.2d 
428, 432 (1st Cir. 1981) (same); Levesque v. Maine, 587 F.2d 78 (1st Cir. 1978) (same); 
Interco, Inc. v. First Nat’l Bank of Boston, 560 F.2d 480, 486 (1st Cir. 1977) (same). 
206. E.g., Spath v. NCAA, 728 F.2d 25, 27 (1st Cir. 1984) (affirming denial of 
interlocutory injunction because movant failed to show likelihood of ultimate success on the 
merits); McDonough v. Trustees of University Sys. of N.H., 704 F.2d 780, 784 (1st Cir. 1983) 
(same); LeBeau, 703 F.2d at 642-43 (same); Burgess, 683 F.2d at 602 (same); Mass. Ass’n for 
Retarded Citizens, Inc., 668 F.2d at 607-08 (same); S.S. Kresge Co. v. United Factory Outlet, 
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While the court of appeals has not delivered a deathblow to the 
sliding scale concept208 it brought forth in Massachusetts Coalition, it 
has apparently rendered it moribund.  In many decisions, the court has 
noted that the likelihood of success factor is “the sine qua non,”209 “the 
main bearing wall,”210 the “crucial”211 element, and “the critical 
question”212 among the four criteria.213  The court of appeals has noted 
that, even if the irreparable injury is “excruciatingly obvious,” the 
movant must still show probability of success on the merits.214  If the 
moving party fails to establish that essential element, “the remaining 
factors become matters of idle curiosity.”215 
Emphasizing the “likelihood” factor means that no matter how 
strong the showing on irreparable injury, the movant must still prove 
likelihood of success on the merits.  In its 2008 decision in Winter, the 
Supreme Court agreed with the First Circuit on this point.216  The recent 
cases in the First Circuit have routinely recited and applied the four-
factor test for preliminary relief,217 having now utilized it for almost 30 
Inc., 598 F.2d 694, 695, 698 (1st Cir. 1979) (same); see also Tuxworth v. Froehlke, 449 F.2d 
763, 764 (1st Cir. 1971).  Indeed the court has stated that failure to demonstrate any one factor 
precludes the issuance of preliminary relief no matter what the showing on the other criteria.  
See Mass. Coalition of Citizens with Disabilities v. Civil Def. Agency, 649 F.2d 71, 74 (1st 
Cir. 1981). 
207. E.g., Kenworth of Boston, Inc. v. Paccar Fin. Corp., 735 F.2d 622 (1st Cir. 1984). 
208. “If a great showing of likely success on the merits is made by a plaintiff, a reduced 
showing of irreparable harm may be appropriate.” Turner v. City of Boston, 760 F. Supp. 2d 
216, 218 (D.Mass. 2011) (quoting Cablevision of Boston, Inc. v. Pub. Imp. Com’n, 38 F. 
Supp. 2d 46, 53 (D.Mass. 1999)), (citing to Ross-Simons of Warwick, Inc. v. Baccarat, 102 
F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 1996) and EEOC v. Astra USA, Inc., 94 F.3d 738, 743 (1st Cir. 1996)). 
209. New Comm Wireless Servs., Inc. v. SprintCom, Inc., 287 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2002). 
210. Ross-Simons, 102 F.3d at 16. 
211. S.F. Real Estate Investors v. Real Estate Inv. Trust of Am., 701 F.2d 1000, 1003 
(1st Cir. 1983). 
212. LeBeau v. Spirito, 703 F.2d 639, 643 (1st Cir. 1983). 
213. See also Waldron v. George Weston Bakeries, Inc., 570 F.3d 5, 9 (1st Cir. 2009); 
Auburn News Co., Inc. v. Providence Journal Co., 659 F.2d 273, 277 (1st Cir. 1981) (“[T]he 
probability-of-success component has loomed large in cases before this court”), cert. denied, 
455 U.S. 921 (1982); accord, Mass. Ass’n of Older Ams. v. Sharp, 700 F.2d 749, 751 (1st Cir. 
1983). 
214. LeBeau, 703 F.2d at 642 (quoting Coalition for Basic Human Needs v. King, 654 
F.2d 838, 841 (1st Cir. 1981) (per curiam)).  But see Cintron-Garcia v. Romero-Barcelo, 671 
F.2d 1, 4 n.2 (1st Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (intimating in dictum that the probability factor may 
not be as important if the harm to the moving party is “particularly severe and 
disproportionate,” an approach that may partially resurrect the sliding scale formulation). 
215. New Comm Wireless Servs., Inc. v. SprintCom, Inc., 287 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2002). 
216. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). 
217. See, e.g., ANSYS, Inc. v. Computational Dynamics N. Am., Ltd., 595 F.3d 75, 78 
(1st Cir. 2010); Nieves-Marquez v. Puerto Rico, 353 F.3d 108, 120 (1st Cir. 2003);  S.E.C. v. 
Fife, 311 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2002);  New Comm., 287 F.3d at 8-9; EF Cultural Travel BV v. 
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years, without any reference to a sliding scale approach.  This stability of 
approach in the First Circuit since 1981 mirrors the stability of criteria 
for preliminary relief in the Massachusetts state courts under the regime 
of Packaging Industries.218 
Finally, despite the stability of the four-factor analysis over the past 
30 years, the court of appeals has injected uncertainties into the 
disposition of motions for temporary injunctions.  For example, it has 
treated the concept of inadequate remedy at law, which the Supreme 
Court has called the essence of injunctive relief in the federal courts,219 
in at least three different ways.  First, it has equated inadequacy with 
irreparable injury.220  That is, the moving party must show that her 
remedy at law is inadequate in order to demonstrate irreparable injury.  
Ordinarily, the legal remedy is adequate if the injury can be 
compensated through money damages.  In this sense, adequate remedy at 
law and irreparable injury are mutually exclusive concepts: the presence 
of one means the absence of the other. 
Second, the court, on occasion, has treated the adequacy notion as 
an independent factor in the formula for interim relief.221  In other 
words, the moving party must establish inadequacy of the legal remedy 
in addition to the four other criteria.  Third, in some cases, the court has 
simply ignored the question whether the moving party has shown that 
her legal remedy is not adequate.222  In contrast, the SJC has defined 
irreparable injury quite clearly: “In the context of a preliminary 
injunction the only rights which may be irreparably lost are those not 
capable of vindication by a final judgment, rendered either at law or in 
Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 581 (1st Cir. 2001); Suarez-Cestero v. Pagan-Rosa, 172 F.3d 
102, 104 (1st Cir. 1999); Ross-Simons of Warwick, Inc. v. Baccarat, Inc., 102 F.3d 12, 15 (1st 
Cir. 1996); see Chevron P.R., LLC v. Rivera Guzman, 2010 WL 446585, at *2 (D.P.R.). On 
occasion, the First Circuit has added the adverb “substantially” to the likely to succeed factor.  
See Lanier Professional Servs., Inc. v. Ricci, 192 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1999). 
218. See generally Kerry, supra note 8. 
219. E.g., Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 88 (1974).  The Court has made the same 
statement regarding motions for permanent injunctions.  E.g., Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper 
Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 57 (1975). 
220. E.g., Itek Corp. v. First Nat’l Bank of Bos., 730 F.2d 19, 22-23 (1st Cir. 1984); 
Levesque v. State of Maine, 587 F.2d 78, 80 (1st Cir. 1978); Interco, Inc. v. First Nat’l Bank 
of Bos., 560 F.2d 480, 484-86 (1st Cir. 1977); Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359, 363 (1st Cir. 
1969). 
221. E.g., Auburn News Co., Inc. v. Providence Journal Co., 659 F.2d 273, 277 (1st 
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 921 (1982). 
222. E.g., S.F. Real Estate Investors v. Real Estate Inv. Trust of Am., 701 F.2d 1000 
(1st Cir. 1983); Rushia v. Town of Ashburnham, 701 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1983); Town of 
Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ., 655 F.2d 428 (1st Cir. 1981). 
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equity.”223 
3. Abbreviated Standards 
Like the Massachusetts state courts, the federal courts have also 
developed an abbreviated set of standards for preliminary relief.  The 
state courts have reduced to two factors the showing needed in civil 
actions commenced by the Attorney General and other governmental 
units and private attorneys general.224  The federal courts have applied 
abbreviated standards in so-called statutory injunction cases, reducing 
the showing to one factor.  That is, where a federal statute authorizes 
injunctive relief, some courts have held that the moving party need only 
show “reasonable cause”225 to believe the defendant has violated or is 
about to violate the statute.  In such cases, Congress is deemed to have 
determined that the other three traditional criteria (i.e., irreparable injury, 
balancing of the harms, and the public interest) favor the moving party. 
The First Circuit Court of Appeals, however, has not generally 
followed the path of other federal appellate courts in applying such 
truncated standards.  Principally, the First Circuit has read Supreme 
Court precedents to preclude the casual application of abbreviated 
standards to the request for an interlocutory injunction.  Before 
exploring the analysis of the First Circuit, this Article addresses the 
approach of the other courts of appeals. 
The federal appellate courts adopting these abbreviated standards 
generally trace this line of cases, if they trace it at all, to the decisions of 
the Supreme Court in United States v. San Francisco226 and Tennessee 
Valley Authority v. Hill,227 both of which involved permanent, not 
temporary, injunctive relief.  In contrast, the Court’s decision in Porter 
v. Warner Holding Co.228 seems to look in a different direction, 
requiring clear congressional intent to alter traditional criteria for 
223. Packaging Indus. Grp. v. Cheney, 405 N.E.2d 106, 112 n.11 (Mass. 1980).  See 
also FISS AND RENDLEMEN, supra note 40.  In the context of a request for a permanent 
injunction, “irreparable harm” means that the moving party does not have an adequate remedy 
at law (i.e., ordinarily damages). 
224. See supra notes 57-76 and accompanying text. 
225. Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Bair, 957 F.2d 599, 604 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 
506 U.S. 821 (1992) (4-R Act forbidding discriminatory state taxation of railroads); see also 
Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Lennen, 640 F.2d 255, 261 (l0th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) 
(same). 
226. 310 U.S. 16 (1940) (Raker Act granting certain rights in federal lands to local 
government). 
227. 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (Endangered Species Act protecting the habitats of moribund 
animals). 
228. 328 U.S. 395 (1946). 
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injunctive relief before courts can apply abbreviated standards: 
Moreover, the comprehensiveness of this equitable jurisdiction is not 
to be denied or limited in the absence of a clear and valid legislative 
command.  Unless a statute in so many words, or by a necessary and 
inescapable inference, restricts the court’s jurisdiction in equity, the 
full scope of that jurisdiction is to be recognized and applied.229 
Although some courts, like the Eighth and Tenth Circuit Courts of 
Appeals,230 have regularly utilized and applied this line of cases, other 
federal courts, including the federal courts in Massachusetts, have been 
less active.  For example, in SEC v. J & B Industries, Inc.,231 a 
Massachusetts federal district court did not require the SEC to show 
irreparable harm because the SEC sought preliminary relief under the 
securities statutes.  The SEC was entitled to a preliminary injunction, the 
court ruled, so long as it made a prima facie showing of violation and 
protecting the public interest outweighed the harm to the defendants.232  
In a recent case arising under the Safe Drinking Water Act,233 the First 
Circuit Court of Appeals recognized the abbreviated standards line of 
decisions (sometimes referred to as a “statutory” injunction as compared 
to the judge-made law), including Bair and Lennen.  It declined, 
however, to apply that line of decisions without taking account of the 
restrictions in Porter.234 
Thus in order for the United States to obtain a permanent injunction 
in the First Circuit against the Massachusetts Water Resources Authority 
for violating the Safe Drinking Water Act, it must satisfy the traditional 
four criteria for injunctive relief.235  The First Circuit took the same 
approach by applying the four-factor test for a preliminary injunction 
sought by a government agency, which argued for the application of 
abbreviated standards.236 
On the other hand, if the party moving for a preliminary injunction 
can show that Congress clearly intended to depart from traditional 
229. Id. at 398; accord, Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311-13 (1982).  
Compare Tennessee Vally Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) with Weinberger, 456 U.S. 
at 311-13. 
230. See supra note 225. 
231. SEC v. J & B Indus., Inc., 388 F. Supp. 1082 (D. Mass. 1974).  The First Circuit 
may have overruled this decision sub silentio in SEC v. Fife, 311 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2002). 
232. The Massachusetts SJC has taken a similar approach when government entities 
seek preliminary injunctions.  See supra notes 42-56 and accompanying text. 
233. United States v. Mass. Water Res. Auth., 256 F.3d 36 (1st Cir. 2001). 
234. Id. at 47-48. 
235. Id. at 50-51. 
236. SEC v. Fife, 311 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2002). 
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equitable principles, or if that conclusion is “necessary and 
inescapable”237 based on the text, legislative history, structure, and 
purpose of the statute, the First Circuit Court of Appeals will apply the 
abbreviated standards.238  In its two leading cases,239 the First Circuit 
held that the government had failed to make the proper showing, so it 
affirmed the orders denying an injunction based on the traditional four 
factors.240 
IV. THE ERIE/HANNA DOCTRINE 
A. Overview 
Derived from the landmark ruling in Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins,241 
the Erie doctrine arises when a federal court is asked to apply state law 
in pending litigation.242  Such requests for the application of state law 
arise in myriad circumstances.  Erie itself settled the question as to state 
“substantive” law.  It premised its holding on the Rules of Decision 
Act,243 which calls for the application of state law unless federal law 
otherwise requires or provides. 
In 1938, the same year the Supreme Court decided Erie, it also 
adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for civil actions 
commenced in a federal court, including where a plaintiff asserted a 
claim based on state law.  Prior to their adoption, the federal trial courts 
had applied generally state rules of procedure in actions at law.244  
Actions in equity and admiralty were excepted from the general rule.245  
Thus after 1938, using legal shorthand, the federal courts would apply 
state “substantive” law in the absence of superseding federal law and 
federal “procedural” rules even if state law created the plaintiff’s claim.  
Soon after Erie the Supreme Court realized that the line between 
237. Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946). 
238. Fife, 311 F.3d at 8; Mass. Water Res. Auth., 256 F.3d at 48. 
239. Fife, 311 F.3d at 8; Mass. Water Res. Auth., 256 F.3d at 48. 
240. The four-factor test for a permanent injunction is nearly identical to the four-factor 
test for a preliminary injunction.  The only difference is that for a permanent injunction, the 
moving party must show actual success on the merits rather than simply a likelihood of 
success.  Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 32 (2008); cf. Mass. Water Res. 
Auth., 256 F.3d at 50 n.15. 
241. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
242. The so-called “reverse-Erie” doctrine arises when a state court is asked to apply a 
federal procedural rule to a federal claim.  See supra note 6. 
243. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006), which derived from Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 
1789. 1 Stat. 92 (1789). 
244. See generally FALLON, JR. ET AL., supra note 87, at 533-43. 
245. Id.; see supra note 122. 
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“substance” and “procedure” was not so easily drawn.246 
The discussion here is limited to the basic Erie question: whether a 
federal judge should apply state law of interlocutory injunctions to a 
state claim in a civil action pending in the federal court.  When 
confronted with a motion for preliminary relief in these Erie-type civil 
actions, the federal district court must decide whether to apply state or 
federal standards, traditional or abbreviated, to the request for the 
injunctive remedy when the claim is rooted in state law. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, the courts have not devoted extensive 
analysis to the issue.  For example, in Grupo Mexico de Desarrollo, S.A. 
v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc.,247 one of a handful of cases where the 
question has surfaced, the Supreme Court refused to entertain the 
argument that state law should govern motions for preliminary 
injunctions in federal civil actions asserting state claims.  The Court 
noted that the party seeking to raise the Erie issue in the Supreme Court 
waived the point because it did not present the question to the lower 
federal courts.248 
B. The First Circuit and Other Authority 
The First Circuit Court of Appeals has taken the same approach as 
the Supreme Court in Grupo Mexico, insisting upon the longstanding 
rule that the party raising an issue, including the Erie doctrine, generally 
must first bring it to the attention of the trial judge.249  In other decisions, 
the First Circuit has simply applied federal preliminary injunction 
standards to state-based claims without discussing the Erie doctrine, 
while applying state law to the substantive issues.250  Thus while the 
“likely to succeed on the merits” criterion as a standard for temporary 
relief is rooted in federal law, the determination whether a plaintiff 
asserting a state law claim is in fact “likely to succeed” is a state law 
question under Erie.251   
246. See, e.g., Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945). 
247. 527 U.S. 308, 318 n. 3 (1999). 
248. Id. 
249. Charlesbank Equity Fund II v. Blinds To Go, Inc., 370 F.3d 151, 158 (1st Cir. 
2004) (party waived the Erie objection by not raising it in the district court).  In sharp 
contrast, subject matter jurisdiction is an exception to the general rule, as the federal courts 
have a “duty” to raise it sua sponte even if no party challenges the court’s jurisdiction.  
Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908). 
250. Waterproofing Sys., Inc. v. Hydro-Stop, Inc., 440 F.3d 24, 33 (1st Cir. 2006); 
Lanier Prof’l Servs., Inc. v. Ricci, 192 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1999); Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc. 
v. PepsiCo, Inc., 160 F.3d 58, 60-61 (1st Cir. 1998). 
251. Hydro-Stop, Inc., 440 F.3d at 33; Lake Charles Diesel, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 
328 F.3d 192 (5th Cir. 2003). 
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In Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc. v. PepsiCo, Inc.,252 however, the 
First Circuit acknowledged that the Erie doctrine could apply to motions 
for preliminary injunctions.  Without delving into the intricacies of the 
question, the court disposed of the matter on the practical ground that the 
“Massachusetts standards [referring to the three-step approach of 
Packaging Industries] for a preliminary injunction do not seem 
markedly different”253 from the federal standards.  The court added that 
the parties in the case had not pointed to any “pertinent state-law 
difference that would govern a federal court in a diversity matter.”254  
The following year, the First Circuit took the same approach: it applied 
federal standards to a motion for temporary relief based on state claims 
“where the parties have not suggested that state law supplies 
meaningfully different criteria.”255 
Upon closer inspection, however, the Massachusetts state standards 
are “markedly” or “meaningfully” different from the federal standards.  
In cases between private parties, for example, the state courts have 
applied a sliding scale, three-step approach under Packaging 
Industries,256 while the federal courts in the First Circuit have applied 
the four-factor test of Bellotti,257 which the United States Supreme Court 
recently confirmed in Winter.258 
For example, the federal standards include an inquiry into the 
impact of the preliminary injunction on the “public interest,” while the 
state standards under Packaging Industries do not include that criterion 
in strictly private party litigation.  In the Winter decision, the Supreme 
Court ruled that the impact of a preliminary injunction on the public 
interest is a critical matter, which the lower federal courts must carefully 
examine.259  Indeed in Winter, the Supreme Court’s inquiry into the 
public interest made a huge difference in the outcome of the motion for 
interlocutory relief.  In private litigation under Packaging Industries, the 
public interest is not a factor. 
In addition, the Packaging Industries standards employ a “sliding 
252. 160 F.3d 58 (1st Cir. 1998). 
253. Id. at 61; accord, Instant Air Freight Co. v. C.F. Air Freight, Inc., 882 F.2d 797 
(3d Cir. 1989) (citing Hanna). 
254. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., 160 F.3d at 61. 
255. Lanier, 192 F.3d at 3; accord, Bio-Imaging Techs., Inc. v. Marchant, 584 F. Supp. 
2d 322 (D. Mass. 2008). 
256. Packaging Indus. Grp., Inc. v. Cheney, 405 N.E.2d 106, 111-12 (Mass. 1980). 
257. Planned Parenthood League of Mass. v. Bellotti, 641 F.2d 1006, 1009 (1st Cir. 
1981). 
258. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). 
259. Id. 
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scale” with respect to each party’s assertions of irreparable harm and 
likelihood of succeeding on the merits, coupled with a balancing test.  
Federal courts, which previously applied a sliding scale test, have 
abandoned it after Winter for the four-factor test the First Circuit has 
followed for 30 years.260  Thus these two approaches, Packaging 
Industries and Winter, are substantially different in their formulations 
and results. 
Furthermore, under state court precedents, the Attorney General, 
other governmental units, or “private” attorneys general need only 
satisfy a two-part test to secure temporary injunctive relief.261  In such 
cases, the plaintiff must demonstrate only that it is likely to succeed on 
the merits and that the public interest is advanced or not adversely 
affected.262   The federal courts in the First Circuit apply the same four-
factor test of Bellotti (and now Winter) no matter who the plaintiff is. 
Other federal courts, applying federal standards to motions for 
preliminary injunctions, have reached the same conclusion as the First 
Circuit in Erie-type cases, sometimes traveling a different route.  For 
example, the Sixth Circuit has referred to the temporary injunction 
standards as “procedural jurisprudence,”263 while applying state law to 
the substantive question whether the moving party is likely to prevail on 
the merits.  Without extensive analysis, the Fourth Circuit264 and the 
Tenth Circuit265 Courts of Appeals have expressly rejected the 
application of state preliminary injunction standards to state claims 
pending in federal court. 
The Fourth Circuit agreed that state law would apply to the motion 
for a permanent injunction, but not to a motion for a temporary 
injunction, which only seeks to preserve the status quo266 and thus 
arguably procedural, not substantive.  The court also observed that the 
state (Virginia) and federal standards for preliminary relief in that case 
260. E.g., Real Truth About Obama v. FEC, 575 F.3d 342, 346-47 (4th Cir. 2009), 
vacated, 130 S. Ct. 2371 (2010) (mem.) (noting Winter overrules prior Circuit precedents, 
including “sliding scale” approach). But cf. Davis v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 571 F.3d 
1288 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (following the four-factor test in Winter, but stating the Court did not 
expressly reject prior Circuit precedents applying a “sliding scale” standard). 
261. See Packaging Indus., 405 N.E.2d at 114. 
262. See supra Part II. 
263. Certified Restoration Dry Cleaning Network, L.L.C. v. Tenke Corp., 511 F.3d 535, 
541 (6th Cir. 2007). 
264. Capital Tool & Mfg. Co. v. Maschinenfabrik Herkules, 837 F.2d 171, 172 (4th Cir. 
1988). 
265. Equifax Servs., Inc. v. Hitz, 905 F.2d 1355, 1361 (10th Cir. 1990). 
266. Capital Tool, 837 F.2d at 172. 
 
WOLF FINAL 51313 7/13/2013  12:58 PM 
2013] PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION STANDARDS 39 
have “no great difference.”267  The Tenth Circuit decision has less 
analysis than the Fourth Circuit opinion.  It simply states that the Erie 
doctrine “does not apply to preliminary injunction standards.”268  Several 
of these cases relied on the Wright, Miller, and Kane treatise on Federal 
Practice and Procedure, which states categorically that federal standards 
always apply to motions for preliminary injunctions in federal courts.269 
In contrast, Professor Burbank has argued that the Wright, Miller, 
and Kane treatise is not correct in applying federal standards to movants 
seeking preliminary injunctions based on state claims, referring to the 
treatise’s argument as “an example of [federal court] overreaching.”270  
Consequently, federal courts, when deciding motions for interlocutory 
relief, “would be required to yield to the requirements of contrary state 
law.”271  In this sense, Rule 65, which contains procedures for 
preliminary injunctions and temporary restraining orders, is procedural 
and does not incorporate the equitable standards for temporary 
injunctive relief.  At least one federal district court allowed that if state 
law precludes an injunctive remedy, the federal court could not award it.  
“It would be anomalous to grant preliminary relief on a state law claim 
that would be unavailable were this case brought in a state court.”272 
Before discussing the general outlines of the Erie doctrine as it 
applies to preliminary injunctions, it is important to note another line of 
cases in the First Circuit that bears on our analysis.   Thirty-six years ago 
in Marshall v. Mulrenin,273 the First Circuit Court of Appeals confronted 
the question of whether the more generous relation back law of 
Massachusetts should govern an amendment to the complaint that added 
new parties after the expiration of the statute of limitations. 
Following the decision in Hanna v. Plumer,274 the trial judge 
applied Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to deny the 
267. Id. at 173. 
268. Equifax, 905 F.2d at 1361.  It cites only to Volume 11C of the WRIGHT & MILLER, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE,  § 2943, at 390 (1973). 
269. WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL 2D § 
2943 (1995 with 2011 supplement); see also WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION 2D § 4513 (1996 with 2011 supplement). 
270. Burbank, supra note 24,  at 1320 n.161. 
271. Id. at 1320. 
272. John Paul Mitchell Sys. v. Quality King Distributors, Inc., 106 F. Supp. 2d 462, 
478 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
273. 508 F.2d 39, 41 (1st Cir. 1974). 
274. 380 U.S. 460 (1965) (discussed infra) (in Hanna, a diversity case, the Supreme 
Court unanimously reversed the First Circuit Court of Appeals, requiring the application of 
Federal Civil Rule 4 rather than a more restrictive state statute on service of process in estate 
administration). 
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motion to amend.  The court of appeals vacated the judgment, and 
remanded for further proceedings.  It held that the state relation back law 
should be applied, rather than Federal Rule 15(c), because “although cast 
in procedural terms, [it] has a direct substantive effect.”275  Recently the 
First Circuit, while affirming the essence of Mulrenin, noted that Hanna 
rejected the application of the substance/procedure line and the 
“outcome determination” test to conflicts involving the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure.276 
C. Erie and Hanna 
1.  Background 
This section will discuss the Erie doctrine as applied to preliminary 
injunctions.  We should recall that Erie held, in light of the Rules of 
Decision Act277 and the powers of the federal courts, “there is no federal 
general common law.”278   Unless federal law otherwise requires or 
provides, the federal court must apply the “laws of the several states.”279  
Thus the decision has come to mean that when state claims are asserted 
in a federal court, the law of that state governs the rulings on the 
substantive claims. 
Courts and practitioners sometimes assume that the Erie doctrine 
applies only to civil actions invoking the diversity jurisdiction.280  That 
assumption is not correct, although post-Erie decisions have 
occasionally intimated it.281  Over 50 years ago, the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals stated that 
[I]t is the source of the right sued upon, and not the ground on which 
federal jurisdiction over the case is founded, which determines the 
275. Mulrenin, 508 F.2d at 44; accord, Covel v. Savetech, Inc., 90 F.R.D. 427, 430 (D. 
Mass. 1981) (following the Mulrenin holding, rejecting apparently contrary law in other 
circuits).  In 1991, the Supreme Court amended Rule 15 to reflect the holding in Mulrenin.  
See FED. R. CIV. PRO. 15(c)(1)(A). 
276. Morel v. DaimlerChrysler AG, 565 F.3d 20, 24 (1st Cir. 2009). 
277. See 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006) (“The laws of the several states, except where the 
Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, 
shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in 
cases where they apply.”). 
278. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 70, 78 (1938). 
279. See 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006). 
280. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006). 
281. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965); Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 
109 (1945).  But see United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (Erie applies to 
state claims asserted in federal court under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction (now referred 
to as supplemental jurisdiction)). 
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governing law . . . .  Thus, the Erie doctrine applies, whatever the 
ground for federal jurisdiction, to any issue or claim which has its 
source in state law. 282 
State substantive law claims, governed by the Erie doctrine, may 
arise in a federal court in at least three types of cases or controversies: 
(1) where a state claim is asserted based on diversity jurisdiction;283  (2) 
where a state claim is asserted based on supplemental jurisdiction;284 and 
(3) where a state claim contains an essential federal element within 
general federal question jurisdiction.285  In each instance, the federal 
court may have to confront the Erie doctrine.  In federal question 
litigation, where state claims are frequently joined with federal claims 
under supplemental jurisdiction, the matter may become more complex 
since the court may need to apply a federal rule to the federal claims and 
a state rule to the state claims.286 
In Erie doctrine cases, the court is asked to apply state law even 
though the civil action is pending in a federal court.  The Rules of 
Decision Act,287 which Congress first enacted in 1789, commanded that 
result, unless federal law “otherwise require[s] or provide[s].”288  The 
Supreme Court departed from that statute in Swift v. Tyson,289 
authorizing the federal courts to apply “federal general common law” in 
controversies based on diversity jurisdiction if the claim involved a 
question of “general” or “commercial” law (as compared to “local” law).  
Ninety-six years later in 1938, the Court overruled Swift in the Erie 
decision.290 
In 1938, the Supreme Court also approved the newly drafted 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for use in the federal district courts.  
282. Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop, Inc., 234 F.2d 538, 540 n.1 (2d 
Cir. 1956) (emphasis in the original). 
283. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006); Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc., 545 
U.S. 546 (2005). 
284. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2006); Allapattah, 545 U.S. 546; cf. United Mine Workers 
v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966). 
285. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006); Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1039 (2013); Grable & 
Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308 (2005); see also Smith v. 
Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921); cf. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. 
Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986). 
286. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 302 (presumptions); FED. R. EVID. 501 (privileges); 28 
U.S.C. (2006) (the state law of presumptions and privileges applies where it provides the rule 
of decision for “an element of a claim or defense”). 
287. See 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006). 
288. Id. 
289. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). 
290. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 85 (1938). 
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Prior to 1938, the federal courts had applied state procedural rules for 
actions at law.291  Thus by the end of 1938, the federal courts in diversity 
cases were applying state substantive rules under Erie where they might 
have applied federal substantive rules under Swift.  At the same time, 
they were also applying the new federal civil rules where they would 
have applied state procedural rules prior to 1938.  “Under the Erie 
doctrine, federal courts sitting in diversity apply state substantive law 
and federal procedural law.”292 
In the wake of Erie, the difficulty the federal courts now confronted 
was where to draw the line between substance and procedure for Erie 
purposes, “a challenging endeavor.”293  The Supreme Court struggled 
with that line, realizing early that some rules or law could be 
characterized either as substantive or procedural, such as statutes of 
limitation.294  Within seven years after the Erie decision, it settled on an 
“outcome determinative” test.295  That is, the federal court would apply 
the state “procedural” rule if it determined the outcome of the litigation, 
as would be the case with limitations periods.  When that test proved 
inadequate, the Court formulated a balancing test of state and federal 
interests.296  In 1965, it sought to settle the matter in Hanna v. Plumer.297 
In the Hanna decision,298 the Supreme Court held that Erie 
problems fall into two broad categories: (1) where the conflicting federal 
“procedural” law arguably falls within the scope of a civil rule 
promulgated pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act299 (REA) (hereinafter 
291. For actions in equity, the Supreme Court had promulgated special rules for such 
proceedings in the federal trial courts.  See supra, notes 99-100. 
292. Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996).  This 
statement would apply to any claim rooted in state law, regardless of its jurisdictional basis in 
federal court.  Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop, Inc., 234 F.2d 538, 540-41 n.1 
(2d Cir. 1956). 
293. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 427 (citation omitted). 
294. See Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).  But cf. McCluny v. Silliman, 28 
U.S. 270, 277 (1830) (stating statutes of limitations are “rules of decision” within the meaning 
of the Rules of Decision Act, now codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006) and requiring the 
application of state limitation periods to claims in federal courts in the absence of a valid 
federal limitation period). 
295. Guar. Trust Co., 326 U.S. at 109. 
296. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Cooperative, Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 535 (1958).  The 
balancing of state and federal interests appears to have survived the decision in Hanna.  See 
generally Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497 (2001); Gasperini, 518 
U.S. 415. 
297. 380 U.S. 460 (1965). 
298. E.g., Hanna, 380 U.S. 460 (dispute involving Rule 4 of the Civil Rules); Stewart 
Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22 (1988) (dispute involving 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)). 
299. 28 U.S.C. §  2072 (2006).  See generally Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling 
Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015 (1982) (the definitive article on the REA). 
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referred to as “rules” conflicts); and (2) where the conflicting federal 
“procedural” law is outside the scope of the REA or other federal statute 
(hereinafter referred to as “non-rules” conflicts).300  In Hanna, the Court 
did not discuss a third possibility: a conflict between an act of Congress 
and state law.301  Under Hanna, the criteria to determine whether state or 
federal law should govern the dispute falls into two categories.  One set 
of criteria governs “rules” conflicts, while another set governs “non-
rules” conflicts.302 
Federal civil actions involving motions for preliminary injunctions 
reasonably could fall into either of the two categories of conflicts and on 
either side of the line drawn in Hanna.  If such a motion is viewed as 
governed by Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, then it 
falls on the “rules” side of the Hanna line (as was the case in Hanna 
itself, which involved Rule 4, the service of process rule).  If, on the 
other hand, the standards governing a motion for a temporary injunction 
are seen as part of the judge-made law of equity, it would fall on the 
“non-rules” side of Hanna.  In all cases, the courts appear to start with 
the premise that the conflict between state and federal law is not clearly 
substantive or procedural, which would be an easy case.  Rather the 
assumption is that the matter at issue falls somewhere between substance 
and procedure, in short, “rationally capable of classification as either.”303 
2. Rules Conflicts 
If the state/federal conflict falls on the “rules” side of the Hanna 
line, the Supreme Court has identified a three-step process to resolve the 
potential conflict.304  First, the federal court determines if the asserted 
federal rule covers or addresses the disputed matter, creating a direct or 
genuine conflict with state law.  If not, then the court should apply both 
300. See also WRIGHT AND KANE, supra, note 131, at § 59.  See generally 
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 131, at § 5.3.5.  
301. The Court has since addressed the Erie doctrine when the conflict is between a 
federal statute and a state law.  Stewart Org., 487 U.S. 22 (dispute involving 28 U.S.C. § 
1404(a)).  In Ricoh, the Court articulated a two-step process that courts should follow: (1) 
decide whether the federal statute and the state law genuinely conflict; and (2) if so, decide 
whether the federal statute is constitutional, thus superseding state law under the Supremacy 
Clause in Art.VI of the United States Constitution.  Id. at 34-35. 
302. In the Supreme Court’s most recent decision in the Erie/Hanna line of cases, 
Justice Ginsburg, dissenting, indicated that the two categories operate sequentially rather than 
independently. Thus if the Court concludes that the state law and the federal rule of civil 
procedure do not conflict, it must then apply the twin goals of Erie to the state law. Shady 
Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct, 1431, 1450 (2010). 
303. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 472. 
304. In Shady Grove, Justice Scalia appeared to adopt a two-step approach, although his 
opinion did not command a majority of the Court. 130 S. Ct. at 1450. 
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state and federal law since the federal rule does not reach the disputed 
question.305 
For example, in Palmer v. Hoffman,306 the parties disagreed 
whether the plaintiff or the defendant had the burden to plead and prove 
contributory negligence.  The plaintiff relied on Rule 8(c) (contributory 
negligence is an affirmative defense) to place the burden on the 
defendant, while the defendant argued for the application of the state 
rule that the plaintiff must prove the absence of contributory 
negligence.307  The Court held that the federal and state rules do not 
conflict: the defendant has the burden to plead contributory negligence 
under Rule 8(c), while the plaintiff has the burden to prove the absence 
of contributory negligence under state law once the defendant has raised 
the issue under Rule 8(c).308 
Second, if the federal rule is broad enough to cover or address the 
dispute, the conflict between state and federal law is genuine.  The court 
must then determine, before applying the federal rule to displace state 
law, if the federal rule is within the scope of the Rules Enabling Act 
(REA):  whether it is a rule of “practice or procedure” under § 2072(a) 
and whether it abridges, enlarges, or modifies “any substantive right” 
under § 2072(b).  If the federal rule is “rationally capable of 
classification,”309 as Hanna ruled, either as substantive or procedural, the 
court will treat it as one of “practice and procedure” under § 2072(a).310  
Having thus classified it as a “procedural” matter (or at least reasonably 
or arguably so), the federal rule consequently would not abridge any 
“substantive” right under § 2072(b).311 
305. E.g., Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497 (2001) (no genuine 
conflict between the state law of claim preclusion and Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure); Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980) (no direct conflict between 
state limitations period tolling provision upon service of process and Rule 3 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, where civil action commences upon filing, not upon service of 
process). 
306. Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943).  Four well-known scholars have referred 
to such cases as “strained” interpretations of the rules to avoid addressing their validity under 
the REA.  RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. 
SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 548 
(6th ed. 2009). 
307. Palmer, 318 U.S. at 116-19. 
308. Id.  In the Supreme Court’s most recent decision in the Erie/Hanna line, Justice 
Scalia appeared less willing to avoid such conflicts, although his opinion did not garner a 
majority of the justices.  Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1431.  In contrast, Justice Ginsburg, 
dissenting, sought to avoid such conflicts.  Id. at 1470 (Ginsburg J., dissenting). 
309. Hanna v. Plummer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965). 
310. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (the Rules Enabling Act). 
311. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (the Rules Enabling Act). 
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Third and finally, the federal judge must determine if the federal 
“procedural” rule is constitutional.  Since Congress has the power to 
establish federal courts and prescribe rules for their governance under 
Article III of the Constitution and the Necessary and Proper Clause of 
Article I, as the Court ruled in Hanna, any rule deemed to be procedural 
will pass constitutional muster.312  The Court’s approach in Hanna lead 
Justice Harlan, concurring, to criticize the majority’s approach as 
“arguably procedural, ergo constitutional.”313  The concurrence stated 
that such an approach passes over the critical limitation in the REA: 
“Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive 
right.”314 
As explored earlier, a state claim in a Massachusetts federal court 
could be subject to conflicting state and federal standards on a motion 
for a preliminary injunction.315  If the state claim were in a 
Massachusetts state court, the trial judge would apply a two-factor, a 
three-step, or a four-stage approach, depending on the criteria noted 
earlier in this article.316  If the state claim were in federal court, the 
federal trial judge would ordinarily apply the four-factor test under the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Winter and the First Circuit’s decision in 
Bellotti and its progeny.317  Applying the state and federal standards to 
the state claim could very well lead to different results, with the moving 
party, say, prevailing under the state standards, while the non-moving 
party would prevail under the federal standards. 
At this point in the proceedings, the federal judge would ask if the 
conflict is in the “rules” category or the “non-rules” category under 
Hanna v. Plumer.  Assuming that Rule 65 is the source of the federal 
standards for preliminary injunctions, then any conflict with state 
standards for temporary relief would fall into the “rules” category under 
Hanna.  If so, then the path to their application is relatively 
straightforward. 
The party supporting the application of federal preliminary 
injunction standards to a state claim in federal court would argue that 
these standards are incorporated into Rule 65 and therefore are 
“procedural,” or at least arguably so.  Several courts outside the First 
312. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471-74. 
313. Id. at 476 (Harlan J., concurring). 
314. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006); Hanna, 380 U.S. at 476 (Harlan J., concurring). 
315. See supra Part I. 
316. See supra Part II. 
317. See supra Part III. 
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Circuit have so held.318  If linked to Rule 65 of the Federal Rules, the 
preliminary injunction standards fall squarely within the holding of 
Hanna v. Plumer.319  Thus the federal court may, consistent with the 
Erie doctrine, apply federal standards to the movant’s request for a 
temporary injunction for its state-based claims.  The straightforward 
argument is that all matters arising after the commencement of the civil 
action relating to the advancement of its resolution are reasonably 
classifiable as procedural if covered by a federal rule of civil 
procedure.320 
The Supreme Court has defined “procedural” as “the judicial 
process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law 
and for justly administering remedy and redress for disregard or 
infraction of them.”321  A rule “is a truly procedural rule [if] it governs 
the in-court dispute resolution processes rather than the dispute that 
brought the parties into court . . . .”322  Thus the application of Rule 65 to 
motions for temporary relief would be permissible under the Rules 
Enabling Act, Erie, Hanna, and the Constitution. 
The Supreme Court has reinforced its “rules conflicts” approach by 
noting the rigorous review process for rules under the REA.  The 
Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules, the Judicial Conference, the 
Court itself, and the Congress successively “study and approv[e]”323 
such rules and their amendments.  In doing so, these entities make a 
“prima facie judgment” that the proposed rule or amendment “in 
318. See Ferrero v. Associated Materials, Inc., 923 F.2d 1441, 1448 (11th Cir. 1991) 
(citing Hanna and Wright and Miller); Instant Air Freight Co. v. C.F. Air Freight, Inc., 882 
F.2d 797, 799 n.4 (3d Cir. 1989) (citing Hanna); Sys. Operations, Inc. v. Scientific Games 
Dev. Corp., 555 F.2d 1131, 1141 (3d Cir. 1977) (citing WRIGHT AND MILLER); Curtis 1000, 
Inc. v. Youngblade, 878 F. Supp. 1224, 1243 (N.D. Iowa 1995) (citing Hanna and Ferrero); 
see generally WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL 2D § 
2943 (1995 with 2011 supplement); WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION 2D § 4513 (1996 with 2011 supplement).  Contra Sims 
Snowboards, Inc. v. Kelly, 863 F.2d 643, 646 (9th Cir. 1988) (Rule 65 is strictly procedural 
and does not incorporate the “traditional equitable power of federal courts” to award 
preliminary relief).  See generally Burbank, supra note 24, at 1320 n.161. 
319. 380 U.S. 460 (1965); cf. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7 (2008) 
(regarding federal preliminary injunction standards, the Supreme Court referred to Rule 65 
and federal equity, without specifying their relationship); Charlesbank Equity Fund II v. 
Blinds to Go, Inc., 370 F.3d 151, 158 (1st Cir. 2004) (noting that the district court looked to 
Rule 65 and “federal equitable principles” as the source for preliminary injunction standards). 
320. See Morel v. DaimlerChrysler AG, 565 F.3d 20, 24 (1st Cir. 2009) and cases 
therein cited. 
321. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941). 
322. Johansen v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 810 F.2d 1377, 1380 (5th Cir. 1987); 
accord Morel, 565 F.3d at 24 (citing Johansen and other precedents). 
323. Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 6 (1987). 
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question transgresses neither the terms of the Enabling Act nor 
constitutional restrictions.”324  Furthermore, even if the application of 
Rule 65 standards for preliminary relief affects substantive rights, such 
impact, the argument goes, only does so “incidentally.”325 
The stumbling block, however, could be the limitation in § 2072(b) 
(the Rules Enabling Act): “Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or 
modify any substantive right . . . .”326  The non-moving party would 
argue that its substantive rights will be violated if the court enters the 
preliminary injunction, which would impact its freedom of action 
(whether the injunction is simply prohibitory or affirmative in nature). 
To some extent, the Supreme Court has danced around this issue, 
partly because it has recognized that the task of drawing the line between 
substance and procedure is “a challenging endeavor.”327  In contrast, the 
Ninth Circuit has defined “substantive” as “concerned with the legal 
rights of the parties”328 at all stages of the litigation, not simply the “final 
outcome on the merits.”329  In many cases where a party seeks 
preliminary relief, the “final outcome” is determined entirely or “in large 
part” at this early stage in the litigation.330  In sharp contrast, other courts 
have ruled that granting or denying a preliminary injunction is not 
“outcome determinative” under the Erie doctrine.331 
In this sense, what could be more substantive than a court order 
limiting freedom of action?  Every injunction restricts the freedom of the 
person enjoined, which could include liberty or property interests or 
324. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added); accord Burlington 
Northern R.R. Co, 480 U.S. at. 6 (having passed through or been reported to these bodies, the 
proposed rule or amendment has “presumptive validity”). 
325. Burlington Northern R.R. Co, 480 U.S. at 5.  See also Shady Grove Orthopedic 
Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010) (plurality opinion). 
326. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006). 
327. Gasperini v. Ctr. For Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996).  Compare Paul 
D. Carrington, “Substance” and “Procedure” in the Rules Enabling Act, 1989 DUKE L.J. 281 
(1989) with Stephen B. Burbank, Hold the Corks: A Comment on Paul Carrington’s 
“Substance” and “Procedure” in the Rules Enabling Act, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1012 (1989). 
328. Sims Snowboards, Inc. v. Kelly, 863 F.2d 643, 645 (9th Cir. 1988) (California 
anti-injunction statute precludes the grant of preliminary relief in a federal court civil action 
alleging state law claims).  But see Compass Bank v. Hartley, 430 F. Supp. 2d 973, 978 n.9 
(D. Ariz. 2006) (stating federal standards apply to motions for preliminary injunctions for 
state claims because the standards are not “outcome-determinative” under the Erie doctrine); 
Sullivan v. Vallejo City Unified School District, 731 F. Supp. 947, 956 (E.D.Cal. 1990) 
(stating federal standards apply to Rule 65 motions for preliminary injunctions for state claims 
because the standards are not part of the substantive right or “outcome determinative” under 
the Erie doctrine). 
329. Sims, 836 F.2d at 646. 
330. Id. at 647. 
331. Supra, note 328 and accompanying text. 
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both.  Similarly, if the court denies the injunction, the liberty or property 
interests of the moving party will be adversely affected.  In either case, 
the “substantive rights” of the parties will be impacted, contravening the 
limitation in § 2072(b). 
3. Non-rules Conflicts 
If the conflict between state and federal standards for a temporary 
injunction falls on the “non-rules” side of the Hanna analytical 
framework, the federal judge would apply a different test.  “Non-rules” 
conflicts involve disputes where no federal rule promulgated under the 
Rules Enabling Act even “arguably” governs the resolution.332  These 
disputes would include conflicts between state law and federal judge-
made law.  Under this alternative analysis, articulated in Hanna, the 
federal standards for preliminary injunctions would be viewed as part of 
the judge-made law of equity, not as incorporated into or authorized by 
Rule 65.333 
The Supreme Court has identified a two-step process for 
determining whether state or federal law applies in these “non-rules” 
conflicts.334  The first step is to determine if state and federal law are 
genuinely in conflict,335 or, in other words, whether the federal law is 
broad enough to reach the disputed issue.336  If not, then the court should 
apply both state and federal law.  If the conflict is genuine or direct or if 
the federal law is broad enough to control the matter before the court, 
then the court must determine which law to apply.  In making this 
determination, the court would evaluate the conflict in terms of the “twin 
aims”337 of Erie:  “discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of 
inequitable administration of the laws.”338 
332. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 131, at § 5.3.5. 
333. Sims Snowboards, 863 F.2d at 646 (stating federal equitable authority to grant 
preliminary relief is separate and apart from Rule 65); cf. Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 
99, 103-06 (1945) (indicating that federal equity is an independent body of law). 
334. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 466-69 (1965); cf. Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed 
Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497 (2001); Gasperini v. Ct. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 
(1996). 
335. See Gasperini, 518 U.S. 415 (finding no genuine conflict between a state law 
allowing appellate review of damage judgments and the Seventh Amendment.). 
336. See Godin v. Schencks, 629 F.3d 79, 86 (1st Cir. 2010) and cases therein cited. 
337. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468. 
338. Id.  The “twin aims” of Erie, as the Court ruled in Hanna, replaced the former 
“outcome determinative” test of Guar. Trust Co., 326 U.S. 99. Whether the twin aims also 
replaced the state/federal interest balancing test of Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. 
Cooperative, Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958), is an open question.  See Semtek Int’l, 531 U.S. 497; 
Gasperini, 518 U.S. 415. 
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The First Circuit Court of Appeals has also applied the “twin goals” 
approach even when the federal rule is not broad enough to address the 
issue.339  It has asked whether a court should decline to apply the state 
law, even without applying a federal law, because declining would 
advance the twin goals of Erie.340  This ruling seems questionable as the 
premise underlying Erie was to prevent federal courts from applying 
federal law (thus displacing state law) and thus to discourage forum-
shopping and to prevent the undermining of state law through its 
inequitable administration.  It also appears inconsistent with the Rules of 
Decision Act,341 which directs the federal courts to apply state law in the 
absence of contrary federal law. 
The Court has referred to these two criteria as governing the 
“typical, relatively unguided Erie choice.”342  In other words, if federal 
law were more favorable than state law to one of the parties, that party 
would choose the federal forum (plaintiffs would commence the action 
in or defendants would remove to a federal court).  Since an action 
asserting state claims would ordinarily be filed and decided in state 
court, but for federal jurisdictional statutes that sometimes reach state-
based claims, litigating the action in federal court could produce 
“inequitable administration of the laws.”343 
As examined earlier, the Massachusetts state and federal criteria for 
preliminary injunctions vary sufficiently so that the state and federal 
courts, applying their own standards, would reach different results in the 
same case involving the same claims and defenses.  They would truly be 
“outcome determinative,”344 a test the Supreme Court redefined in 
Hanna into the “twin aims” of Erie.  If the plaintiff has a choice of state 
or federal court, the attorney who plans to seek a preliminary injunction 
would choose the forum more favorable to his client, that is, where the 
client would have a better chance of securing temporary relief. 
As noted earlier, state claims may appear in federal court 
complaints by three avenues: (1) diversity jurisdiction;345 (2) 
339. See Godin v. Schencks, 629 F.3d 79, 86 (1st Cir. 2010).  In the Supreme Court’s 
most recent decision in the Erie/Hanna line of cases, Justice Ginsburg, dissenting, took a 
similar approach.  Thus even if state law and the federal rule of civil procedure do not conflict 
(or the federal rule does not cover the disputed question), the court must then apply the twin 
goals of Erie to the state law.  Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 
130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010) (Ginsburg J., dissenting); see also Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 415. 
340. See Godin, 629 F.3d at 86. 
341. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006). 
342. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471. 
343. Id. at 468. 
344. See Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945). 
345. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006); see generally supra note 283. 
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supplemental jurisdiction;346 and (3) general federal question 
jurisdiction.347  In each of these instances, the plaintiff may choose the 
state or federal court.  If the plaintiff chooses a Massachusetts state 
court, the defendant may remove the civil action to the federal court over 
the plaintiff’s objection,348 where the standards for preliminary relief are 
more favorable.  In some instances, though, the plaintiff may seek to 
structure the complaint to make the civil action non-removable.349  After 
all, the plaintiff is the master of the complaint. 
With federal forums frequently available to both plaintiffs and 
defendants in civil actions alleging state-based claims, the divergent 
standards for preliminary relief under Massachusetts state and federal 
law would undermine the Erie goal of discouraging forum-shopping.  
“The general equitable powers of federal courts should not enable a 
party suing in diversity to obtain an injunction if state law clearly rejects 
the availability of that remedy.”350  Conversely, the federal “equitable 
powers” should not be used to deny a preliminary injunction when state 
law would grant it.  Indeed the search for the more favorable forum, 
state or federal, would be rampant, with plaintiffs, wishing to sue in state 
court and remain there, using pleading devices to prevent removal, while 
defendants would be seeking to attack such devices so removal could be 
effected.351 
The only way to avoid forum-shopping is to apply the state 
standards to the motion for preliminary relief whether the civil action is 
pending in state or federal court when the claim is based on state law.  
The Federal Rules of Evidence have two rules addressing the 
Erie/Hanna doctrine.  Both rules require the federal courts to follow the 
state law of presumptions (Rule 302) and privileges (Rule 501) where 
state law provides the rule of decision for “an element of a claim or 
defense.”352  That concept should be applied to motions for preliminary 
relief in federal court when state law claims are alleged. 
Regarding the other aim of Erie, to prevent the inequitable 
administration of the law,353 the varying state and federal standards for 
346. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2006); see generally supra note 284. 
347. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006); see generally supra note 285. 
348. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2006). 
349. Cf. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980) (joining 
non-diverse defendants to prevent removal of the case from the state court to federal court). 
350. Sims Snowboards, Inc. v. Kelly, 863 F.2d 643, 647 (9th Cir. 1988). 
351. Cf. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 286 (using lack of personal 
jurisdiction of non-diverse defendants to permit removal). 
352. FED. R. EVID. 302, 501 (2012) 
353. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965). 
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preliminary relief would also offend that goal.  Given two identical cases 
in a state and federal court in Massachusetts involving state-based 
claims, the plaintiff, for example, in the state court litigation would have 
a better chance of obtaining a temporary injunction under a two or three-
pronged approach of Packaging Industries (and its progeny) than a 
similarly-situated plaintiff in federal court under the four-pronged test 
the Supreme Court articulated in Winter354 and the First Circuit has 
applied for almost 30 years.  The only difference in the two outcomes is 
the forum in which the litigation is pending.  That kind of inequality in 
the administration of justice is what Erie and its progeny,355 including 
Hanna, have sought to prevent. 
4. Erie/Hanna Avoidance 
Federal judges have a variety of tools to avoid this potential 
violation of the Erie doctrine without having to address the difficult Erie 
questions.  Historically, as noted earlier, the Supreme Court has sought 
to reconcile the arguably conflicting state and federal law through 
interpretation of state and federal law.356  If such harmony occurs, the 
federal court simply applies the state and federal law without having to 
resort to the Supremacy Clause of Article VI.  But avoidance of the 
difficult Erie/Hanna conflicts can be achieved through other 
discretionary exercises of federal judicial power.357 
First, with regard to state claims in federal court under the 
supplemental jurisdiction statute,358 the trial court could invoke its 
discretionary authority under § 1367(c) of that statute to dismiss the state 
claims.359  Section 1367(c) provides four grounds for discretionary 
dismissal of supplemental claims.360  Three of the grounds are relatively 
specific and cabined.  The fourth is somewhat indeterminate.  The 
grounds for dismissal of the state claim (the supplemental claim) may fit 
one of the first three, relatively specific paragraphs of § 1367(c).  If not, 
the trial court could invoke the fourth, more open-ended ground that 
allows the court to dismiss a supplemental claim when “in exceptional 
circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining 
354. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7 (2008). 
355. E.g., Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497 (2001); Gasperini 
v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996). 
356. E.g., Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980). 
357. See generally David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
543 (1985). 
358. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2006). 
359. See Id. § 1367(c). 
360. Id. 
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jurisdiction.”361  Protecting the integrity of Erie and Hanna, which are 
central to our federal system of government, might well qualify as 
“exceptional circumstances” and “compelling reasons.”362 
Second, regarding state claims in federal court under the general 
federal question jurisdictional statute, the federal judge also has some 
discretion to dismiss, taking account of the four factors the Supreme 
Court identified as controlling in the Grable decision.363  In Grable the 
Court affirmed the right of a plaintiff to invoke federal question 
jurisdiction if its state-based claim has an essential federal element, 
which is substantial and disputed, so long as the allocation of such cases 
to the federal courts “is consistent with congressional judgment about 
the sound division of labor between state and federal courts. . . .”364 
Finally, civil actions brought under the diversity statute present 
more challenging issues for the trial judge to exercise discretion to 
dismiss the state claims, which ordinarily comprise the entire case.  
Federal courts have assumed that if a plaintiff properly alleges grounds 
to assert diversity jurisdiction (complete diversity and amount in 
controversy), that plaintiff is entitled to be in federal court.  Despite that 
assumption, the Supreme Court has ordered discretionary dismissals of 
state claims in diversity cases under the “abstention” doctrines.365 
CONCLUSION 
The standards for the grant or denial of a preliminary injunction 
overlap in some cases and are considerably different in others when the 
action is pending in a Massachusetts state or federal court.  While the 
Supreme Judicial Court has developed three sets of criteria, depending 
on the nature of the case, the First Circuit Court of Appeals, with 
Supreme Court guidance, has adopted a four-factor test which it has 
employed in virtually every case since 1981, no matter the nature of the 
civil action or the parties to it. 
In some cases, the state and federal standards for preliminary relief 
are nearly identical, while in others they differ dramatically.  Such 
differences lead to different results depending whether the case is in 
361. Id. § 1367(c)(4). 
362. Id. 
363. Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc., v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308 (2005); 
accord Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1039 (2013). 
364. Id. at 313. 
365. E.g., County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185 (1959) (diversity 
jurisdiction); see also Ala. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Southern Ry. Co., 341 U.S. 341 (1951) 
(diversity and federal question jurisdiction); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943) 
(same). 
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state or federal court, or if in a federal court, whether the judge applies 
state or federal standards to the plaintiff’s state-based claims.  For 
attorneys who have a choice of filing in state or federal court when their 
claims are based on state and federal law, they should consider these 
differences when seeking preliminary injunctive relief.  If their case ends 
up in federal court because they have filed there or because the 
defendant has removed the action from state to federal court, they then 
must seriously consider whether to urge the federal judge to apply state 
standards to their state-based claims. 
Because the federal courts in Massachusetts have generally applied 
federal standards for interlocutory relief in all cases, no matter the source 
of the plaintiff’s claim, they have not addressed the critical Erie/Hanna 
question whether state standards should apply when the claim in the 
federal litigation turns on state substantive law.  By finessing the issue 
because the objecting party did not raise the question in the trial court or 
by stating that the state and federal standards are not “markedly” 
different, the First Circuit has avoided the difficulties of the Erie 
doctrine.  But the state and federal standards for temporary relief are 
significantly different in some instances, affecting the result of the 
motion for a preliminary injunction. 
This Article advances the point that the grant or denial of 
preliminary relief impacts the substantive rights of the parties and should 
be governed by state standards in federal civil actions alleging state 
claims.  Because they impact substantive rights, the application of 
federal standards to state claims violates the Rules Enabling Act and the 
twin aims of the Erie doctrine: to discourage forum-shopping and to 
avoid inequitable administration of the laws.  The federal courts in 
Massachusetts need to confront this critical matter.  The United States 
Supreme Court could help, first, by drawing a clearer line between 
substance and procedure under the Rules Enabling Act, and, second, by 
defining “rules of decision” more precisely in the Rules of Decision Act. 
 
